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FAKING IT EVEN AFTER YOU MAKE IT?  
EXPLORING HOW ORGANIZATIONAL LAY THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE 
IMPACT CHEATING ON DIFFICULT TASKS 
 
Organizational lay theories of intelligence (i.e., beliefs shared within an organization about the 
nature of intelligence) have been found to play an important role in shaping people’s experiences 
and behavior within particular settings (Emerson & Murphy, 2015a; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). In 
three studies, I investigated whether an organization’s entity (i.e., intelligence is fixed) or 
incremental (i.e., intelligence is malleable) lay theory might impact people’s cheating behavior 
in a demanding testing context. Results revealed that people tended to cheat more in the entity 
(vs. incremental) environment after failing to meet a high performance standard. In Study 2, 
participants perceived cheating to be more common in the entity (vs. incremental) organization 
and that the entity organization endorsed performance-avoidance goals more and mastery goals 
less; yet, these perceptions did not statistically mediate participants’ cheating. In Study 3, 
participants cheated more in the entity (vs. incremental) context even after being praised for their 
past performance; notably, the type of praise that participants received influenced the particular 
cheating strategy they employed. 
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1 
Faking it Even After you Make it? Exploring How Organizational Lay Theories of Intelligence 
Impact Cheating on Difficult Tasks 
 
It was a company that prized “sheer brainpower” above all else, where the task of sorting 
out “intellectual stars” from the “merely super-bright” was the top priority when making 
hires and promotions. It was an environment where one of the most powerful executives 
was described as being “so sure that he was the smartest guy in the room that anyone who 
disagreed with him was summarily dismissed as just not bright enough to ‘get it.’  
            
–Description of Enron (McLean & Elkind, 2003) 
 
[CEO Lou] Gerstner disbanded the management committee and often went outside the 
upper echelons for expertise. “Let’s put together in meetings the people who can help 
solve a problem, regardless of position.” The message: We’re not looking to crown a few 
princes; we need to work as a team. Gerstner was also appalled by the endless failure to 
follow through on deals and decisions, and the company’s unlimited tolerance of it. He 
demanded and inspired better execution. Message: Genius is not enough; we need to get 
the job done. 
–Description of IBM (Dweck, 2006) 
 
The above descriptions of the organizational cultures at Enron and IBM reflect strikingly 
different perspectives on human intelligence, ability, and potential. Enron endorsed a culture that 
prized genius and talent above all else and aimed to identify and promote those who they 
believed possessed these valued traits. Alternatively, IBM believed that hard work and effort 
were key contributors to success, and subsequently sought to cultivate intelligence and ability 
through effort, training, and growth.  
Researchers describe these distinct approaches to organizational culture as reflecting 
differences in organizational lay theories of intelligence—the shared beliefs of people within a 
setting—such as a school, company, or workgroup—about the nature of intelligence and ability 
(Emerson & Murphy, 2015a; 2015c; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). Some organizations espouse an 
entity theory, in which intelligence and ability are believed to be fixed traits that only some 
people possess (Murphy & Dweck, 2010). Other organizations espouse an incremental theory, in 
 	  
	  
2 
which intelligence and ability are viewed as malleable attributes that can be cultivated through 
effort (Murphy & Dweck, 2010). These theories extend decades of research on personal lay 
theories of intelligence (for a review, see Dweck, 1999) to refer to an organization’s norms and 
values, often conveyed through its materials (e.g., mission statements, brochures), policies and 
practices (e.g., hiring and evaluation decisions), or directly by its leaders. 
Early research on organizational lay theories of intelligence demonstrated that people 
experience entity and incremental environments very differently. In their seminal work, Murphy 
and Dweck (2010) had participants read about and apply to an attractive entity or incremental 
academic club. Results revealed that participants were more likely to call attention to the quality 
they believed the club valued; people who applied to the entity club were more likely to highlight 
their smarts (i.e., their GPA and test scores) whereas people who applied to the incremental club 
were more likely to emphasize their motivation (i.e., their passion for learning). Moreover, the 
organizations’ beliefs influenced participants’ self-concepts, such that people reported valuing 
their own smarts (vs. motivation) more when applying to the entity (vs. incremental) club. 
Notably, the organizational lay theory that participants were exposed to had a “sticky” effect 
during an ostensibly unrelated hiring task. Participants who had previously applied to the entity 
club preferred an applicant who demonstrated her smarts 78% of the time; conversely, 
participants who had applied to the incremental club preferred an applicant who stressed her 
motivation 92% of the time.  
In sum, people appear to be able to distinguish between entity and incremental 
organizations, and their perceptions of these organizational lay theories can guide their behavior, 
including whether they accentuate, personally value, and even make decisions based on the 
attributes that are prized by the organization. What other behaviors might these organizational 
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lay theories influence? In the current research, I explored whether an organization’s beliefs about 
intelligence might impact an important organizational outcome that is often tied to beliefs about 
intelligence and ability—cheating behavior.  
Cheating Behavior: A New Frontier for Organizational Lay Theories Research 
Understanding how organizational lay theories of intelligence might shape cheating 
behavior is valuable because cheating in school—and academic dishonesty more broadly—is a 
prevalent and persistent problem. As many as 70% of American students are estimated to have 
cheated at some point during their college career, about 50% higher than rates in the 1950s and 
1960s (Baird, 1980; Davis & Ludvigson, 1995; Goldsen, Rosenberg, Williams, & Suchman, 
1960; Jendrek, 1992; McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 2001). Moreover, academic cheating has 
important consequences beyond the act itself. Students who cheat successfully are more likely to 
continue cheating, both in school (Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, 1996; McCabe & Trevino, 1997) 
and in other contexts, like work (Carpenter, Harding, Finelli, & Passow, 2004; Nonis & Swift, 
2001). In other words, cheating is a pervasive societal issue—and one that does not appear to be 
going away any time soon. 
Traditionally, cheating researchers searched for personal attributes that lead some 
students, and not others, to cheat. These researchers attempted to create profiles of “cheaters,” 
whom they described as male (Davis, Grover, Becker, & McGregor, 1992; Koul, 2012; Rettinger, 
Jordan, & Peschiera, 2004), low in ability (Finn & Frone, 2004; Newstead, Franklyn-Stokes, & 
Armstead, 1996), and younger (Antion & Michael, 1983; Haines, Diekhoff, LaBeff, & Clark, 
1986; Lipson & McGavern, 1993). Psychologically, “cheaters” are more likely to believe that 
cheating is acceptable (Cizek, 1999; Evans & Craig, 1990; Rettinger & Kramer, 2009; Schab, 
1991), endorse performance goals (vs. mastery) goals (Bong, 2008; Murdock, Hale, & Weber, 
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2001; Rettinger & Jordan, 2005) and report high need for approval from others (Jacobson, 
Berger, & Millham, 1970; Lobel & Levanon, 1988; Millham, 1974). Yet, the limitations of this 
individualistic perspective have been discussed at length, particularly in light of mixed support 
for these profiles (for a review, see Jordan, 2001; McCabe & Trevino, 1997; Whitley, 1998). 
In response to these limitations, there has been a shift toward also examining cultural, 
structural, and contextual factors that might affect cheating (Jordan, 2001; McCabe et al., 2001; 
Murdock & Anderman, 2006; Murdock, Miller, & Kohlhardt, 2004). For instance, cheating is 
less common in institutions with explicit, well-known honor codes (Jordan, 2001; McCabe & 
Trevino, 1993) and with severe penalties for cheating (Michaels & Miethe, 1989; Whitley, 1998). 
Bolstering this perspective, McCabe and Trevino (1997) found that whereas individual factors 
predicted 9% of the variance in self-reported cheating behavior among their participants, 
situational factors predicted 21% of the variance.  
Importantly, these contextual cues can shape cheating behavior without addressing 
cheating overtly. Researchers have found that cheating is more common in competitive 
environments (Perry, Kane, Bernesser, & Spicker, 1990; Taylor, Pogrebin, & Dodge, 2002) and 
in contexts where teachers are perceived to value performance over mastery (Anderman, 
Griesinger, & Westerfield, 1998; Bong, 2008; Roeser, Midgley, & Urdan, 1996; Urdan, Midgley, 
& Anderman, 1998). These situational cues are thought to influence cheating because they 
provide information about how these institutions construe success and failure, which in turn 
affects people’s experiences there—including the goals they strive toward, the norms they 
perceive, whether they feel valued in the organization, and whether or not they cheat. Building 
upon this burgeoning literature, a primary goal of the current research was to investigate whether 
an organization’s lay theory of intelligence might also be a contextual cue that influences 
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people’s cheating behavior. Even though these organizational beliefs do not reference cheating 
directly, they nonetheless may moderate students’ academic cheating behavior because they 
provide information about how the organization perceives success and failure, hard work, and 
human potential.   
Why and how might organizational lay theories shape people’s cheating behavior? The 
current work is the first to explore this specific question; however, research on personal lay 
theories of intelligence—or an individual’s beliefs about the fixed or malleable nature of 
intelligence—provides a theoretical foundation that can be extended to understand the 
relationship between cheating behavior and beliefs about intelligence held at the group-level.   
Personal Lay Theories of Intelligence & Cheating Behavior 
Research spanning more than 30 years has elucidated the different ways that people who 
personally endorse entity and incremental theories construe academic performance tasks (for a 
review, see Dweck, 1999). Entity theorists believe that intelligence is a trait that is relatively 
fixed over the lifespan. Because intelligence cannot be changed much, it is a quality that only 
some people possess—people either are smart, talented, or gifted, or they are not. Moreover, 
because entity theorists believe that intelligence is an attribute that can be measured and 
identified, they tend to be driven by performance goals (Dweck, 1986; 1991; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988). In other words, if only some people are talented or smart, entity theorists are motivated to 
show themselves and others that they possess these traits.  
When a task is easy, entity theorists are able to perform well and often report feeling 
successful (Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Henderson & Dweck, 1990). 
However, when a task is at the frontier of their abilities and failure is a possibility, they become 
uncomfortable. For entity theorists, failure indicts their abilities and suggests that they may not 
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possess intelligence (Diener & Dweck, 1978; 1980; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin & Wan, 1999). 
Therefore, they believe they must consistently prove their intelligence to avoid revealing to 
themselves or others that they lack talent or ability. Difficulty and failure also depress entity 
theorists’ more global self-judgments. Indeed, research has found that entity theorists link their 
performance to their general sense of self-worth (Burhans & Dweck, 1995; Henderson & Dweck, 
1990; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008); they view themselves as worthy or valued only when they 
perform well and as worthless or deficient when they perform poorly. In sum, potential failure 
has substantial negative implications for entity theorists’ beliefs about both their abilities and 
their self-worth. For this reason, one might expect entity theorists to strive to preserve their self-
worth by demonstrating competence at any cost, including by potentially cheating on difficult 
tasks.   
Incremental theorists differ dramatically from entity theorists in how they experience 
performance and achievement. They believe that intelligence is a malleable quality that can be 
significantly expanded over time by anyone who puts in a lot of effort. For this reason, 
incremental theorists are driven by mastery goals (Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Elliott & Dweck, 
1988). Importantly, they want to succeed, just as entity theorists do. However, entity and 
incremental theorists measure success in different ways; whereas entity theorists consider 
success to be effortless high performance, incremental theorists measure success primarily in 
terms of learning over time and persistence in the face of challenges and setbacks. 
 When tasks are easy, incremental theorists—like entity theorists—are able to complete 
tasks confidently and successfully (Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Henderson & 
Dweck, 1990). However, they diverge noticeably from entity theorists in their response to 
difficult tasks. Although incremental theorists acknowledge that facing challenges may lead to 
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failure, they are less threatened by the potential of poor performance because it is not viewed as 
indicting their abilities. Instead, difficulty is construed as a challenge to overcome or as a signal 
that more effort or a different strategy is needed (Diener & Dweck, 1978; 1980; Hong et al., 
1999). Because they do not view intelligence as fixed, incremental theorists are likely to feel 
most valuable when they improve over time (Burhans & Dweck, 1995; Henderson & Dweck, 
1990; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). In sum, if incremental (vs. entity) theorists are less likely to 
tie their self-worth to their ability to sustain high effortless performance, we might expect them 
to also cheat less on demanding tasks.  
Empirical tests of the association between personal lay theories and cheating have 
measured participants’ lay theories and tested whether these beliefs are related to their cheating 
beliefs or self-reported cheating behavior (e.g., Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; 
Corrion et al., 2010; Dweck & Sorich, 1999). These studies found that, relative to incremental 
theorists, entity theorists view cheating as more acceptable and report more past cheating 
behavior. In the most direct test of a causal relationship, Blackwell and colleagues (2007) 
measured middle school participants’ personal lay theories and then asked them to imagine 
failing an important quiz. They then indicated how they would cope with the failure, including 
whether they would use negative, effort-avoidant strategies like cheating. Results revealed that 
participants who endorsed an entity theory were more likely to consider using negative 
strategies—including cheating—after hypothetical failure compared to those who endorsed an 
incremental theory. Taken together, previous research suggests that personally endorsing more 
fixed beliefs about intelligence may lead people to cheat when faced with a difficult task. 
Although researchers have yet to examine the causal role of personal lay theories of 
intelligence on cheating behavior, studies that have manipulated participants’ lay theories have 
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found that they can shape whether people display other defensive behaviors (e.g., Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). In one set of studies, participants who were primed 
with an entity theory were more likely to disengage when faced with a challenging language 
task—they expressed a greater desire to discontinue with the task and avoid it in the future 
(Hong et al., 1999). Those primed with an incremental theory, on the other hand, were more 
likely to face the challenge head on, indicating a desire to retry the difficult task and devote more 
time and energy to it in the future. Thus, exposure to an entity theory can lead people to take 
more defensive actions—actions related to cheating—in the face of difficulty. However, 
researchers have yet to directly test whether being exposed to an organization’s lay theory may 
moderate people’s actual cheating behavior—the focus of the current studies.  
Cheating in Entity and Incremental Organizations: Theory & Preliminary Evidence 
Past research has provided important insights into how personal beliefs about the fixed or 
malleable nature of intelligence can influence people’s behavior. Yet, a central feature of human 
existence is that people exist within the context of groups. Indeed, many have theorized that 
being accepted by attractive and valued groups is a fundamental human motivation (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995; Swann & Bosson, 2010). Importantly, groups can espouse their own beliefs 
about human intelligence and ability—beliefs that can independently shape the behavior of 
people within them. The current work seeks to explore how fixed and malleable beliefs espoused 
at the group level influence how these environments are perceived and how people behave 
within them. Moreover, by considering organizational lay theories of intelligence, I am able to 
consider the role of factors that are unique to groups—like organizational norms—in people’s 
cheating behavior (Jordan, 2001).    
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How do people perceive entity and incremental organizations? And how might these 
perceptions shape people’s cheating behavior? Entity organizations believe that people are either 
competent and able, or they are not—and those with talent can be identified through their 
performance for hiring and promotion (Emerson & Murphy, 2015a; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). 
Just as entity theorists are concerned with performing well, people in entity organizations may 
feel they have to prove their intelligence and abilities. Indeed, they may worry that performing 
poorly will be interpreted by the entity organization as evidence that they are not smart or gifted 
enough to succeed there. Moreover, people’s perceived worth may become tied to their 
performance in an entity context—they may expect to be valued by the organization only when 
they are performing well. When faced with an easy task, people may feel sufficiently confident 
in their ability to perform well. However, when faced with a demanding task, concerns about 
performing well may lead people in entity organizations to take drastic measures to show that 
they “have it”—like cheating.  
Incremental organizations value effort and persistence in the face of challenges over easy 
tasks that engender effortless high performance (Emerson & Murphy, 2015a; Murphy & Dweck, 
2010). Although incremental organizations value intelligence, they believe that people can 
develop their abilities over time if motivated to do so and therefore seek out people who work 
hard, face challenges head on, and persist in the face of setbacks. Furthermore, incremental 
organizations construe difficulty and failure as an opportunity to learn something new and stretch 
one’s potential. In response, people may worry less about performing perfectly in incremental 
environments, instead focusing their energy on pursuing challenges and improving themselves. 
Additionally, they may tie their perceived worth to their personal growth rather than effortless 
performance. For these reasons, when faced with an easy task, people in incremental contexts—
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like those in entity contexts —may feel confident in their ability to perform well. In contrast, 
when faced with a difficult task, people in incremental environments may be driven to persevere 
and grow rather than avoid failure—and thus may cheat less.  
 Preliminary evidence suggests that organizational lay theories of intelligence do in fact 
influence cheating behavior. In one study, employees at seven Fortune 1000 companies 
completed a survey about their perceptions of their organizations’ beliefs and values. Results 
revealed that employees who perceived that their company endorsed an entity theory reported 
higher levels of unethical behavior in their organization, including cheating (Emerson, Murphy, 
Dweck, Chatman, & Kray, 2014). In another study (Emerson & Murphy, 2015b), independent 
coders rated the perceived organizational lay theory of all companies in the Fortune 500 based on 
their mission and values statements. The same statements were run through linguistic analysis 
software to identify underlying themes (Linguistic Inquiry Word Count; Pennebaker, Chung, 
Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007). A negative relationship emerged between entity theory 
ratings and the use of ethics-related words like “integrity,” “ethics,” and “transparency” in the 
mission statements—the more that a company was perceived to endorse an entity theory, the less 
likely it was to highlight ethics and integrity in its mission and values statement. 
 Though correlational, this research points to another important difference that may exist 
between entity and incremental organizations—organizational norms about cheating. Norms 
research distinguishes between descriptive norms (i.e., norms about what behavior is typically 
exhibited) and injunctive norms (i.e., norms about what behavior is acceptable or preferred; 
Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). If people are motivated to 
avoid poor performance at all costs in entity (vs. incremental) organizations, they may perceive 
that others are similarly motivated, and thus that cheating is more widespread there (i.e., a pro-
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cheating descriptive norm). Furthermore, people may perceive that entity organizations desire 
performance and results by any means necessary and are more accepting of unethical strategies 
like cheating to achieve these goals (i.e., a pro-cheating injunctive norm). Importantly, empirical 
evidence suggests that descriptive and injunctive norms can be independent predictors of 
intention and behavior (Jacobson, Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011; Kredentser, Fabrigar, Smith, & 
Fulton, 2012; White, Smith, Terry, Greenslade, & McKimmie, 2009). Building upon these 
findings, the current work sought to examine whether entity and incremental organizations are 
perceived to differ in their descriptive and injunctive cheating norms, and whether these 
perceptions might explain people’s cheating behavior in the two environments.   
The Present Studies 
 In three studies, participants performed for an organization (via a problem-solving task) 
after learning about its entity or incremental lay theory. At the end of the task, participants were 
given the opportunity to cheat—to misreport their task performance and number of items 
attempts to the organization. The goal of the first study was to explore the relationship between 
organizational lay theories of intelligence and cheating behavior. When participants perceived 
that they performed poorly (vs. well) on the task, did they self-enhance by cheating more in the 
entity (vs. incremental) context? In the second study, I explored why people cheated more on 
difficult tasks in entity organizations than in incremental ones. Specifically, I examined the 
extent to which participants’ cheating behavior was mediated by their perceptions of the club 
(i.e., perceived cheating norms and performance vs. mastery goals) or by their self-judgments 
(i.e., self-worth and self-esteem). Finally, in the third study, I investigated whether being praised 
by the club for their prior success would moderate participants’ cheating behavior. In particular, 
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would people in the entity (vs. incremental) club self-enhance by cheating more on a demanding 
task even when affirmed by their past performance? 
Study 1 
 The goal of Study 1 was to establish whether organizational lay theories of intelligence 
influence people’s cheating behavior. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to 
understand how people apply to organizations. As part of this investigation, participants were 
informed that they would learn about and be asked to apply to an attractive and prestigious 
academic tutoring club at their university. They learned about the club by reading a sample of the 
club’s meeting minutes (in which the organizational lay theory manipulation was embedded). 
They then completed the application process, which consisted of a member application and a 
problem-solving task. A high or low performance standard was provided before completion of 
the task to manipulate participants’ perception of their performance. Thus, the study was a 3 
(organizational lay theory: entity, incremental, control) X 2 (performance standard: low, high) 
between-subjects design. After they completed the problem-solving task, they were asked to self-
report their performance and number of items attempted—the measures of cheating behavior.  
When the performance standard was low—and thus attainable—I predicted that 
participants in both the entity and incremental contexts would feel successful and thus not cheat 
about their performance or number of items attempted on the task. However, I predicted 
differences between the two contexts when participants could not meet the standard. In an entity 
environment, I expected participants to worry that not meeting the standard would signal to the 
club that they lack the natural smarts and talent that are prized there. In contrast, I expected that 
participants in the incremental context would be less concerned about effortless high 
performance and more with working hard and improving. For these reasons, when faced with a 
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high performance standard, I predicted that participants would be more likely to self-enhance in 
the entity (vs. incremental) context by inflating their performance and downplaying their number 
of items attempted.1  
Study 1 Method 
Participants 
 Three hundred undergraduate participants were recruited from introductory psychology 
courses at a large public Midwestern university and participated in exchange for partial course 
credit. Participants were excluded from analysis if they met either of two criteria. First, 
participants were excluded if they did not follow directions by writing their responses to the 
problem-solving task on the paper answer sheet (n = 16). Those who did not write down their 
response could not self-score them, and therefore could not complete the primary outcome of 
Study 1 (i.e., (mis)reporting their performance and number attempted). Second, participants were 
excluded if they did not experience the performance standard condition as it was intended. 
Because the purpose of the low standard condition was for participants to meet the standard, they 
were excluded if they failed to meet it (i.e., completed fewer than 3 items correctly; n = 29). In 
contrast, the purpose of the high standard condition was for participants to fail to meet the 
standard; thus, participants in this condition were excluded if they met or exceeded the standard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 One might hypothesize that because incremental organizations highly value effort and 
persistence, people in these contexts instead might be more likely to cheat about their number of 
items attempted on a difficult task. However, because incremental organizations place more 
emphasis on self-improvement rather than demonstrating a “natural” talent or ability, I predicted 
that people in these organizations would be less concerned about being evaluated against some 
external metric than people in entity organizations, and thus would strive to grow over time 
rather cheat to look like they performed better and more effortlessly than other people in the 
organization.  
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(i.e., completed 10 or more items correctly; n = 16).2 Based on these criteria, two hundred and 
forty participants remained in the sample for all analyses. (Cell sizes ranged from 36 to 43.) 
 One hundred and sixty five participants self-identified as female and 73 self-identified as 
male (2 did not self-identify their gender). Additionally, 180 participants self-identified as 
White/Caucasian, 9 as Black/African American, 12 as Asian American/Pacific Islander, 6 as 
Latino/a, 3 as Middle Eastern, 1 as Native American, and 16 as more than one racial group (13 
did not self-identify their race). Finally, the sample consisted of 141 freshmen, 57 sophomores, 
26 juniors, and 13 seniors (3 did not self-identify their year in school). 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the lab, participants were led into individual rooms and told that they 
would be participating in two separate studies. The first study was described as part of a larger 
project assessing undergraduates’ opinions and experiences. Participants completed a series of 
questionnaires that included the measure of personal beliefs about cheating.  
 The procedure for the second study was adapted from past research (Emerson & Murphy, 
2015c; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). The experimenter informed participants that the goal of the 
study was to examine how people apply to organizations. Participants learned about the XYZ 
club, an ostensible tutoring and volunteering organization at their university. They were told 
about the club’s prestige and attractiveness and were asked to imagine that they would like to 
join the club. Next, they read a sample of the club’s meeting minutes, which contained the 
organizational lay theory of intelligence manipulation (described below). After reading the 
meeting minutes, participants were asked to complete a member application (via paper and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 All analyses in Study 1 were also conducted including participants who did not experience the 
performance standard manipulation as it was intended (i.e., the second exclusion criteria). The 
pattern of results of these analyses did not differ from the results reported for Study 1, and are 
thus not discussed further. 
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pencil) and problem-solving task (via computer). Participants were informed that the club’s 
selection committee used the application and task to make acceptance and rejection decisions. 
Before completing the problem-solving task, participants were provided with the 
ostensible average performance of current club members, which served as the performance 
standard manipulation (described in greater detail below). They also were told that the computer 
program had been having technical problems; therefore, they would be asked to indicate their 
responses to the items both on the computer and on a separate paper answer sheet as a back up. 
Participants were left alone to complete the problem-solving task. At the end of the task, all 
participants received an error message indicating that their responses may not have been 
recorded. However, the computer in fact recorded the actual number of items that participants 
attempted to answer and their responses to those items.   
 Due to the ostensible computer malfunction, the experimenter asked participants to hand-
score their own responses. They were given an answer key to compare to their responses. On a 
separate form, they were asked to indicate the number of items they answered correctly and the 
number they attempted to answer. They then shredded their original answer sheet. Finally, 
participants completed some survey items—including measures of their personal lay theory of 
intelligence and liking of the club—before being probed for suspicion, debriefed, and excused. 
Materials 
Meeting minutes. The sample meeting minutes that participants read when learning 
about the XYZ club were adapted from Murphy and Dweck (2010) and Emerson and Murphy 
(2015c). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three organizational lay theory 
conditions: an entity condition, an incremental condition, or a control condition.  
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In the entity condition, participants learned about the club’s support of and future plans to 
work with “Project Smart.” Project Smart endorsed the belief that intelligence and ability are 
innate characteristics that are relatively fixed over the lifespan. For this reason, the goal of 
Project Smart was to identify students’ natural ability and match work to their skill level—that is, 
to give harder work to “smarter” students and easier work to low-performing students. In the 
incremental condition, participants learned about the club’s support of and plans to work with 
“Project Learn.” Project Learn endorsed the belief that intelligence and ability can be 
significantly expanded over the lifespan. For this reason, the goal of Project Learn was to 
provide all students with challenging work so that they may develop, learn, and discover new 
things. Finally, in the control condition, participants learned about the club’s support of and 
plans to work with “Project Tech.” The description of Project Tech did not mention beliefs about 
intelligence at all; instead, Project Tech believed that people could best be tutored if they are 
provided with the opportunity to use different types of technology. For this reason, the goal of 
Project Tech was to integrate various forms of technology into classrooms and tutoring sites to 
educate students in an increasingly high-tech world (see the Appendix for the full text of all 
study materials and measures).  
In all three conditions, club members expressed agreement with the Project’s beliefs 
based on their experiences with tutees. For example, members of the entity club reported 
observing that the initial performance of their tutees predicted their later grades. In contrast, 
members of the incremental club reported observing that tutees’ grades reflected their 
improvement over time. Finally, members of the control club reported observing that tutees 
differed in their experience with new technology. 
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Member application. The member application requested demographic information from 
the participant (e.g., year in school, gender, race, majors considering, SAT/ACT score) and 
information about clubs or organizations that they were currently in or hoped to join. Participants 
also were asked to list some personal characteristics (including grades and stories of personal 
improvements) that they would like to discuss in their application. The primary purpose of the 
member application was to strengthen the cover story that they were applying to the XYZ club. 
Performance standard information. Immediately before completing the problem-
solving task, participants learned about the average performance on the task by current club 
members (i.e., the performance standard). In the low standard condition, participants were 
informed that the task was very difficult and that, on average, current members answered three to 
five (out of 18) items correctly in 20 minutes. This number was selected because past work has 
found that participants typically complete four or five items correctly in the time allotted on this 
specific test (Emerson & Murphy, 2015c). Thus, most participants in the low standard condition 
were expected to be able to meet the standard. In the high standard condition, participants were 
informed that the task was very difficult and that, on average, current members answered 10 to 
12 items correctly. This range is approximately two standard deviations above the actual average 
performance on this task (Emerson & Murphy, 2015c); therefore, most participants in the high 
standard condition were expected to fail to meet the standard. 
Problem-solving task. Participants completed Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices 
(Raven, 1982). The test is considered a measure of general intelligence that asks participants to 
complete a pattern using a missing element. Participants had 20 minutes to complete 18 
progressively difficult items. This task has been used to assess children’s cheating behavior after 
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receiving smarts or effort-related praise (Mueller & Dweck, 1998) and to examine performance 
differences in entity and incremental organizations (Emerson & Murphy, 2015c).  
Primary Measures 
Manipulation checks. To assess participants’ perceptions that the XYZ club endorsed an 
entity or incremental lay theory of intelligence, they completed Emerson and Murphy’s (2015a) 
Organizational Lay Theories scale. The scale included 4 items, rated on a 6-point scale (strongly 
agree to strongly disagree). A sample item includes, “The XYZ club seems to believe that people 
have a certain amount of intelligence, and they can’t really do much to change it.” Items were 
reverse-coded as necessary and averaged so that higher scores indicated perceptions that the 
organization endorsed entity beliefs and lower scores indicated perceptions that the organization 
endorsed incremental beliefs (α = .96).  
At the end of the study, participants’ memory for the two manipulations was assessed. 
Participants were asked to indicate the project discussed in the meeting minutes (i.e., Project 
Smart, Project Tech, Project Learn) as well as the average number of items answered correctly 
on the problem-solving task by current members (i.e., 0-2, 3-5, 6-9, 10-12, 13-15, 16-18). 
Actual performance and number attempted. Participants’ responses on the problem-
solving task were recorded by the computer (via MediaLab). Participants’ actual performance 
was calculated by summing the number of correct responses; their actual number attempted was 
calculated by summing the number of items for which participants provided any answer. The 
number of items attempted by participants was considered as a proxy for their effort on the 
task—the more items that participants attempted, the more presumed effort that they applied to 
the task. Thus, I was able to examine whether the organizations’ beliefs about intelligence or 
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performance standard influenced participants’ actual performance (i.e., the number of items 
answered correctly) or effort (i.e., the number of items attempted).  
Measures of cheating degree. Two cheating indexes were calculated for each participant 
to assess how much they cheated about their performance and number attempted—the primary 
measure of cheating. Degree of cheating has been used in past work to assess how personal lay 
theories of intelligence and performance (vs. mastery) goals impact cheating behavior (Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008; Van Yperen, Hamstra, & van der Klauw, 2011). To investigate whether 
participants self-enhanced by inflating their performance more in the entity (vs. incremental) 
context, a variable was calculated in which their actual number correct was subtracted from their 
reported number correct. A score of zero on this variable indicated an absence of misreporting 
their performance, whereas scores further from zero indicated a greater degree of misreporting. 
Positive scores indicated that participants reported performing better than they actually did (i.e., 
inflated their performance); in contrast, negative scores indicated that participants reported 
performing worse than they actually did (i.e., downplayed their performance). 
To explore whether participants also downplayed their number attempted in entity (vs. 
incremental) contexts, a second variable was calculated in which participants’ actual number 
attempted was subtracted from their reported number attempted. A score of zero indicated an 
absence of misreporting their attempts; scores further from zero indicated a greater degree of 
misreporting. Positive scores indicated that participants reported attempting more items than they 
actually did (i.e., inflated their attempts); negative scores indicated that participants reported 
attempting fewer items than they actually did (i.e., downplayed their attempts). 
Measures of cheating frequency. Separate variables were created to identify whether or 
not participants cheated about their number correct or number attempted—distinct from their 
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degree of cheating. Multiple researchers have found that most people tend to cheat by only a 
small amount, presumably to maintain a balance between economic gain and preserving a 
positive view of themselves as moral and honest (Ariely, 2012; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; 
Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). If this were the case, measures of cheating degree might 
not achieve sufficient variability to detect an effect. By including measures of cheating frequency, 
I was also able to explore whether participants would be more likely to inflate their performance 
and downplay their attempts in an entity organization compared to an incremental one.  
Three variables were calculated to assess cheating frequency. First, a variable was created 
to measure whether participants cheated by inflating their performance by at least one item (0 = 
no, 1 = yes). A second variable was created to identify whether participants downplayed their 
number attempted by claiming to have attempted at least one item fewer than they actually did (0 
= no, 1 = yes). Downplaying their number attempted could serve two purposes. If participants 
performed well, they might opt to under-report their number attempted to demonstrate that they 
could perform well with little effort. However, if participants performed poorly, under-reporting 
their number attempted could serve a self-handicapping function—that is, it could preserve the 
possibility that they could have performed better if they had completed additional items.  
Finally, a variable was created to identify whether participants inflated their number 
attempted by claiming to attempt at least one more item than they actually did (0 = no, 1 = yes). 
Including this variable allowed for the possibility that participants might self-enhance by 
claiming that they exerted more effort on the task than they actually did.  
Importantly, most participants did not misreport their task performance or number 
attempted (reported separately for each study). Thus, any statistical analyses that included the 
cheating frequency variables were noticeably underpowered. Due to this power concern, and 
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because I did not predict the pattern of participants’ degree and frequency of cheating to differ in 
any meaningful way, I included all cheating frequency results as footnotes and focused my 
discussion on the results of the cheating degree measures. 
Demographics. Participants’ gender, race, year in school, and majors were collected as 
part of the member application and/or the unrelated first study.  
Control Measures 
 Three variables were included as covariates in analyses to establish that organizational 
lay theories of intelligence—above and beyond these variables—caused observable differences 
in cheating. In particular, participants’ personal beliefs about cheating acceptability, personal lay 
theories of intelligence, and ACT/SAT scores were assessed. These covariates were selected 
because personally believing that cheating is acceptable, espousing that intelligence is fixed, and 
demonstrating lower past academic performance have all been linked robustly to higher rates of 
cheating (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007; Finn & Frone, 2004; Rettinger & Kramer, 2009). Because 
the goal of the current work was to examine the effect of a group-level variable (i.e., 
organizational lay theories) on cheating behavior, it was important for Study 1 to establish that 
any differences in cheating behavior were not due only to individual factors.   
Personal beliefs about cheating acceptability. Three items assessed participants’ beliefs 
about the acceptability of cheating (Anderman et al., 1998). Each item was rated on a 5-point 
scale (not at all to very true of me). A sample item is, “It is okay to cheat on schoolwork.” Items 
were reverse-coded as necessary and averaged so that higher scores indicated the personal belief 
that cheating is more acceptable (α = .81). 
Personal lay theory of intelligence. To measure participants’ personal beliefs about 
intelligence, they completed Dweck’s (1999) Theories of Intelligence scale. The scale included 4 
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items rated on a 6-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree). A sample item includes, 
“You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do much to change it.” Items 
were reverse-coded as necessary and averaged so that higher scores indicated endorsement of 
entity beliefs and lower scores indicated endorsement of incremental beliefs (α = .85).  
Past academic performance. Participants were asked to provide their SAT/ACT scores. 
These scores were standardized to create an index of past academic performance.3 
Study 1 Results 
Research Design and Analysis Overview 
 The study was a 3 (organizational lay theory: control, entity, incremental) X 2 
(performance standard: low, high) between-subjects design. For each outcome, two separate 
analyses were conducted—one without covariates (a 3 X 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA)) and 
one with covariates (a 3 X 2 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)).4  
Manipulation Checks 
 The results of the primary manipulation check provided evidence that the organizational 
lay theory manipulation had its intended effect. Only the predicted main effect of organizational 
lay theory emerged, F(2, 2325) = 105.53, p < .001, η2p = .48. In particular, the entity club was 
perceived as endorsing more entity beliefs (M = 3.88, SD = 1.62) than the incremental club (M = 
1.54, SD = 0.49), p < .001. Interestingly, the control club (M = 2.02, SD = 0.76) fell between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Inspection of the data revealed that many participants across the three studies did not self-
report their SAT/ACT score; thus, the sample sizes used in analyses with covariates are much 
smaller. The implications of these reduced sample sizes for interpreting the results are discussed 
in the manuscript where relevant. 
4 For all analyses of cheating frequency, a 3 X 2 generalized linear model test (GLM; with a logit 
link function and binomial probability distribution) was conducted without covariates.   
5 Any differences in degrees of freedom here and in subsequent analyses reflect missing data on 
the part of participants. 
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two other clubs and significantly differed from each: it was perceived as endorsing entity beliefs 
less than the entity club, p < .001, but more than the incremental club, p = .004. 
  Generally, participants also accurately recalled the conditions to which they had been 
assigned. Only 5 participants (2.09%) did not correctly recall the Project (i.e., Tech, Smart, or 
Learn) they had read about in the meeting minutes. Thirteen participants (5.44%) in the low 
standard condition and 16 participants (6.69%) in the higher standard condition did not correctly 
identify the performance standard (i.e., the club member average) provided to them.6  
Actual Performance and Number Attempted 
 Consistent with past research (Emerson & Murphy, 2015c), participants answered five 
items correctly on the problem-solving task (M = 4.93, SD = 2.53, range: 0-17). Additionally, 
most participants attempted to answer nearly all of the items (M = 17.48, SD = 1.55, range: 8-18). 
 I next examined whether participants’ actual performance was influenced by the 
organizations’ lay theory and performance standard. Results revealed only a main effect of 
performance standard, F(1, 234) = 27.70, p < .001, η2p = .11. Specifically, participants in the low 
standard condition (M = 5.78, SD = 2.55) performed better (i.e., answered more items correctly) 
than did participants in the high standard condition (M = 4.14, SD = 2.25). No other effects were 
significant, all ps > .80. This main effect remained significant when including covariates, F(1, 
174) = 14.857, p < .001, η2p = .08 (see Table 1 for means). 
 Regarding participants’ number attempted, two main effects emerged. First, participants 
in the low standard condition (M = 17.27, SD = 1.87) attempted marginally fewer items than did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 All analyses were also run excluding participants who failed at least one of the manipulation 
checks. Because results did not differ with this additional exclusion criterion, all reported 
analyses included these participants. 
7 A main effect of past performance also emerged, F(1, 174) = 13.23, p < .001, η2p = .07: 
participants with higher SAT/ACT scores performed better on the problem-solving task.  
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participants in the high standard condition (M = 17.67, SD = 1.15), F(1, 234) = 3.839, p = .051, 
η2p = .016. Second, a main effect of organizational lay theory was significant, F(2, 234) = 5.080, 
p = .007, η2p = .042. Participants in the incremental condition (M = 17.06, SD = 2.10) attempted 
fewer items than did participants in the control and entity conditions (M = 17.74, SD = 0.96, p 
= .004 and M = 17.67, SD = 1.20, p = .010, respectively). The number of items attempted by 
participants in the control and entity conditions did not differ, p = .795. The organizational lay 
theory X performance standard interaction was not significant, p = .331. When including all 
covariates, only the main effect of organizational lay theory remained, F(2, 174) = 2.998, p = .05, 
η2p = .03. (The pattern of pairwise comparisons did not change—see Table 2 for means.)  
 In sum, participants performed better but tended to attempt fewer items when the 
performance standard was low (vs. high). Moreover, participants attempted fewer items when 
they were applying to the incremental (vs. entity or control) organization. Yet, the organization’s 
lay theory and performance standard did not interact to predict participants’ actual performance 
or number attempted. 
Cheating Measures 
Descriptive statistics. Approximately 30% of participants (n = 71) misreported their 
performance. In particular, 18% of participants (n = 43) inflated their performance by over-
reporting the number of items they answered correctly by at least one item. In contrast, fewer 
than 9% of participants (n = 20) misreported their number attempted. Less than 4% of 
participants (n = 8) inflated the number of items they attempted, whereas 5% of participants (n = 
12) downplayed their number attempted. Thus, whereas few participants misreported their effort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A marginal main effect of past performance also emerged, F(1, 174) = 2.77, p = .10, η2p = .02: 
participants with higher SAT/ACT scores attempted fewer items on the task. 
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(i.e., number attempted), a sizeable portion of participants (almost 20%) self-enhanced by 
inflating their performance. 
Cheating about performance. Did an organization’s lay theory and performance 
standard impact the extent to which to which participants cheated about their performance? 
Results revealed only a main effect of performance standard condition, F(1, 234) = 9.36, p 
= .002, η2p = .04. Participants misreported their performance to a greater degree—specifically, 
by inflating their performance—when the standard was high (M = 0.58, SD = 2.10) compared to 
when it was low (M = -0.09, SD = 0.96). No other effects were significant, all ps > .46. This 
main effect remained significant after including covariates, F(1, 174) = 9.519, p = .002, η2p = .05 
(see Table 3 for means). In other words, people cheated more about their performance when the 
performance standard was high; however, the degree to which participants cheated about their 
performance was not influenced by the organization’s lay theory.10 
Cheating about number attempted. Next, I examined whether the organization’s lay 
theory or performance standard influenced how much participants cheated about their number 
attempted (i.e., their effort). The ANOVA revealed only a marginal main effect of performance 
standard, F(1, 234) = 3.71, p = .06, η2p = .02. Participants downplayed their number attempted 
more when the performance standard was high (M = -0.46, SD = 2.51) compared to low (M =      
-0.01, SD = 0.49). No other effects were significant, all ps > .64. When including covariates, the 
marginal performance standard main effect remained, F(1, 174) = 3.26, p = .073, η2p = .018 (see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A marginal main effect of participant’s lay theory also emerged, F(1, 174) = 3.03, p = .08, η2p 
= .02: consistent with past work, entity theorists cheated more about their performance.   
10 Forty-three participants inflated their performance on the problem-solving task (cell size 
ranges: 2-13). The only significant effect to emerge in the GLM test was a main effect of 
performance standard, χ2(1) = 11.572, p = .001. Specifically, participants were more likely to 
self-enhance by inflating their performance when the performance standard was high (n = 33) vs. 
low (n = 10). No other effects were significant, all ps > .34. 
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Table 4 for means). No other effects were significant, all ps > .185. In sum, participants were 
more likely to downplay their number attempted when the performance standard was high.11 
Study 1 Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 suggest that an organization’s performance standard—and not their 
beliefs about intelligence—influenced participants’ cheating behavior. When the club had a high 
performance standard—a standard that they could not attain—participants inflated their 
performance (i.e., over-reported their number correct) and downplayed their number attempted. 
Importantly, both of these actions can serve as self-enhancing strategies. Over-reporting one’s 
number correct can inflate one’s perceived performance. On the other hand, under-reporting 
one’s number attempted can be used as a form of self-handicapping; by claiming to have not 
attempted all of the items, participants can argue that they would have performed better if they 
had more time or had put forth more effort on the task.  
 Contrary to predictions, organizational lay theories of intelligence did not influence 
participants’ cheating behavior. However, fewer than 50 participants cheated about their 
performance, and fewer than 20 participants misreported their number attempted in either 
direction. Therefore, the lack of significant effect of organizational lay theory or interaction 
effects may have been due to a lack of statistical power. Prior to data collection, a power analysis 
was conducted on past work to determine the desired number of participants. Because the current 
work is the first to examine the role of organizational lay theories of intelligence on people’s 
actual cheating behavior, I was limited to conducting separate power analyses on past research 
that a) explored the role of organizational lay theories of intelligence on people’s behavior and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Only 8 participants inflated and 12 participants downplayed their number attempted on the 
task (cell size ranges: 0-4 and 0-3, respectively). Neither GLM test revealed any significant 
effects, all ps > .998 and .600, respectively. 
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that b) examined actual cheating behavior. Results of these analyses suggested that 30 to 50 
participants per cell would be sufficient to obtain 80% power, and thus the high end of this range 
was used as a stopping rule for data collection in Study 1. However, because of the novelty of 
Study 1’s research question, this cutoff may not have been adequate to find an effect. To address 
this concern, the desired sample size was doubled in Study 2.  
Study 2 
The primary goal of Study 2 was to again investigate whether organizational lay theories 
of intelligence influenced people’s cheating behavior. To deal with the feasibility issues that 
accompany the doubling of a study’s sample size, I simplified the design for Study 2. My key 
prediction was that people would only cheat more in the entity (vs. incremental) club when the 
testing context was sufficiently demanding and concerns about failure were high. Therefore, all 
participants learned about either an entity or incremental club with a high performance standard. 
The study consisted of a single independent variable (i.e., organizational lay theory) with two 
levels (i.e., entity and incremental). 
In Study 2, I also sought to explore how organizational lay theories influence cheating 
about one’s performance and effort. Three sets of mechanisms were tested: perceptions of the 
organization’s goals, perceptions of its cheating norms, and participants’ self-judgments.  
 An entity organization’s belief that intelligence is an innate human trait might influence 
people’s perceptions of its goals and norms. In an entity environment, only some people are 
thought to have the natural talent and giftedness that are so highly prized. People may worry that 
they have to perform well (and with little effort) to prove that they have these valued traits, 
which may lead them to cheat when faced with potential failure. Moreover, they may believe that 
everyone in the organization is worried about proving themselves, and thus that others frequently 
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cheat to avoid the consequences of poor performance (i.e., a pro-cheating descriptive norm). 
People might even believe that an entity organization is more accepting of cheating. If an entity 
organization want results and success, they might encourage their members to achieve these 
goals by any means necessary, even at the expense of behaving ethically (i.e., a pro-cheating 
injunctive norm). Perceiving that an entity organization espouses these performance goals and 
pro-cheating norms may in turn lead people to cheat when faced with a difficult task.  
 Given that incremental organizations values self-improvement and mastery—the 
“potential” for increasing success over time—people may perceive them to have very different 
goals and norms than entity organizations. People may perceive that an incremental organization 
endorses mastery goals, and that personal growth (rather than perfection) is more valued there. 
To the extent that people perceive that an incremental organization views failure as a temporary 
setback (rather than as an indictment of one’s abilities), they may avoid cheating on even the 
most demanding tasks. Moreover, if cheating is perceived as counter-productive to personal 
growth, then people may likewise expect that others will cheat less in incremental environments 
and that defensive strategies like cheating would be particularly unaccepted there—additional 
factors that may cause people to cheat less in incremental organizations compared to entity ones.  
 In sum, people may cheat more in entity (compared to incremental) organizations 
because of differences in the organizations’ perceived norms and goals. First, people may 
perceive entity organizations to endorse performance goals more and mastery goals less 
compared to incremental organizations. Moreover, cheating may be perceived as relatively 
widespread and accepted in an entity context and as relatively uncommon and unaccepted in an 
incremental context. These latter predictions are particularly noteworthy because past work on 
lay theories of intelligence and cheating has focused on people’s personal beliefs, and thus has 
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been unable to look at the role of norms—a uniquely group-level variable. By focusing on 
organizational lay theories of intelligence, the current study was the first to directly test whether 
group-level beliefs about intelligence can shape the perceived norms of that environment.  
 In addition to the effect of perceived organizational goals and norms, people may cheat 
more in entity (vs. incremental) contexts because of how these environments influence their 
perceived worth and self-esteem. Particularly when faced with a demanding task, people may 
experience greater self-doubt in an entity environment compared to an incremental one. In 
particular, people may report lower levels of self-esteem in an entity context and that their actual 
self-worth is tied to their ability to perform well on the demanding task. Yet, some research 
suggests that merely performing in an entity environment is not sufficient to elicit negative self-
views. Indeed, entity theorists only report dips in self-esteem and self-worth after poor 
performance or negative feedback (Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Henderson & Dweck, 1990; Hong et 
al., 2009; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008). To explore this question further, Study 2 examined 
whether participants would report higher levels of performance-contingent self-worth and lower 
levels of self-esteem when faced with a challenging task in an entity (vs. incremental) 
organization, and whether these negative self-judgments, in turn, might cause participants to 
cheat more in entity contexts. 
A final goal of Study 2 was to rule out an alternative hypothesis—namely, that people 
simply like entity contexts less than incremental ones, and that this overall negativity bias toward 
the entity organization might be the primary reason for cheating behavior. This hypothesis is 
consistent with past research showing that people tend to prefer incremental contexts to entity 
ones (Emerson & Murphy, 2015a; Emerson et al., 2014; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). In other 
words, can people’s perceptions of the organizations’ norms and goals and their self-judgments 
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simply be reduced down to differences in how much they like the organization? To investigate 
this possibility, I examined whether any observed relationship between an organization’s lay 
theory of intelligence, its perceived norms and goals, and participants’ self-judgments and 
cheating behavior would emerge above and beyond differences in participants’ preference for the 
incremental over the entity organization.      
Study 2 Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred and thirty seven undergraduate participants were recruited from 
introductory psychology courses at Indiana University and participated in exchange for partial 
course credit. Participants were excluded from analysis if they met either of the two criteria 
outlined in Study 1. Eighteen participants were excluded who did not write their responses to the 
problem-solving task on the paper answer sheet because they could not complete the primary 
dependent variable. Twenty-three participants were excluded because they completed 10 or more 
items correctly, and thus did not experience the task as sufficiently demanding.12 Thus, 198 
participants remained in the sample for all analyses. (Cell sizes were 97 and 101.) 
 Ninety-six participants self-identified as female and 100 self-identified as male (2 did not 
provide gender information). Additionally, 157 participants self-identified as White/Caucasian, 
18 as Black/African American, 9 as Asian American/Pacific Islander, 2 as Latino/a, 1 as Middle 
Eastern, 1 as Native American, and 8 as Bi/Multiracial (2 did not provide race information). 
Finally, the sample consisted of 119 freshmen, 53 sophomores, 12 juniors, and 14 seniors. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 No participants were excluded for correctly answering fewer than three items because the low 
performance standard (i.e., 3-5) condition was not included in Study 2. 
 	  
	  
31 
Procedure 
 The procedure for Study 2 mirrored that used in Study 1, with three primary exceptions. 
First, to create a sufficiently demanding testing context—the context in which I expected 
cheating differences—all participants were exposed to the high performance standard condition 
used in Study 1. Second, immediately after learning about the organization, participants 
completed a series of measures assessing their impressions of the club. These measures included 
perceptions of the club’s descriptive and injunctive norms about cheating, perceptions that the 
club valued performance (vs. mastery), participants’ performance-contingent self-worth, and 
their state self-esteem. Finally, at the end of the study, participants completed a measure that 
assessed their liking of the club.  
Materials 
Meeting minutes. The same meeting minutes from Study 1 were used in Study 2. 
However, only the entity and incremental organization conditions (“Project Smart” and “Project 
Learn,” respectively) were included. 
Member application. The same member application from Study 1 was used. 
Performance standard information. As in Study 1, participants learned about the 
average performance on the task by current club members (i.e., the performance standard) before 
completing the problem-solving task. However, given that participants were only expected to 
cheat in a demanding testing context (i.e., when the performance standard was high), all 
participants were informed that, on average, past members answered 10 to 12 items correctly.  
Problem-solving task. Like Study 1, Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices was used 
as the problem-solving task in Study 2.  
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Primary Measures  
Measures from Study 1. The following measures and calculations were again used in 
Study 2: organizational lay theory manipulation checks (perceived organizational lay theory: α 
= .97), demographic information, computer-recorded number correct and number attempted, 
measures of cheating degree, and measures of cheating frequency. Additionally, the same control 
measures from Study 1 were included in Study 2: personal lay theory of intelligence (α = .92), 
SAT/ACT score, and personal beliefs about cheating acceptability (α = .79). 
Perceived organizational goals. To assess perceptions that the XYZ club endorsed 
performance or mastery goals, participants completed an adapted version of the Patterns of 
Adaptive Learning Scale (PALS; Midgley et al., 2000). Five items13 measured beliefs that the 
organization valued mastery goals (e.g., In the XYZ club, it’s okay to make mistakes as long as 
you are learning.). Five items measured beliefs that the organization valued avoiding failure (i.e., 
avoidance-oriented performance goals; e.g., In the XYZ club, one of the main goals is to avoid 
looking like you can’t do the work.), and three items measured beliefs that the organization 
valued achieving success (i.e., approach-oriented performance goals; e.g., In the XYZ club, 
getting right answers is very important.). Each item was rated on a 5-point scale (not at all to 
very true) and the scores were averaged to create three composites: a mastery goals composite (α 
= .70), a performance-avoidance goals composite (α = .91), and a performance-approach goals 
composite (α = .85). 
The distinction between performance-avoidance and performance-approach goals was 
important to establish. Whereas some researchers have argued that entity beliefs are associated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Participants completed the entire six-item mastery goals subscale developed by Midgley and 
colleagues (2000). However, the reliability of the six items was very low (α = .38). Examination 
of the factor loadings revealed that a single item did not adequately load with the others and thus 
was removed; therefore, a five-item composite was used throughout the analyses.  
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with both types of performance goals (e.g., Dweck, 1986; Elliott & Dweck, 1988), there is 
literature to suggest that performance-avoidance goals—that is, a fear of failure—may be 
particularly associated with both entity beliefs and cheating behavior (Butler & Shibaz, 2008; 
Elliot, 1999; Schab, 1991). Thus, an additional goal of the current work was to establish whether 
entity organizations were associated more with performance-avoidant and performance-approach 
goals, and which of these types of performance goals mediated cheating behavior. 
Perceived organizational cheating norms. Participants’ perceptions of the XYZ club’s 
descriptive and injunctive cheating norms were assessed among a host of filler norms. For the 
descriptive norm measure, participants were asked the extent to which they thought members of 
the XYZ club typically “cheat”, “lie,” “behave ethically” (reverse-coded), and “are honest” 
(reverse-coded). For the injunctive norm measure, participants were asked the extent to which 
they thought the club accepts that its members do the same behaviors. All items will be rated on 
a 6-point scale (not at all to extremely) and averaged into two subscales, with higher scores 
indicating more pro-cheating descriptive (α = .71) and injunctive (α = .60) norms. 
Performance-contingent self-worth. Participants completed the academic competence 
subscale of the Contingencies of Self-Worth scale (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 
2003). They completed five items rated on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). 
The items were adapted to reflect how participants currently felt. A sample item is, “Right now, I 
feel bad about myself if my academic performance is lacking.” Items were reverse-coded as 
necessary so that higher scores indicated greater performance-contingent self-worth (α = .69). 
State self-esteem. State self-esteem was assessed using the performance component of 
Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-Esteem scale. This measure consisted of seven items 
rated on a 5-point scale (not at all to extremely) (e.g., “At this moment, I feel confident about my 
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abilities”). Items were reverse-coded as necessary so that higher scores indicated more positive 
state self-esteem (α = .85).  
Liking of the club. Participants were asked to indicate their liking of the XYZ club via 
six items: how appealing and desirable they found the club, how interested in and motivated 
they were to join the club, and how likely they would be to recommend the club to a friend who 
needed tutoring or who wanted to be a tutor. All items were rated on a 5-point scale (not at all to 
extremely) and averaged such that higher scores indicated greater liking of the club (α = .88). 
(See Table 6 for the correlation coefficients between all mediators included in Study 2.) 
Study 2 Results 
Research Design and Analysis Overview 
 The study consisted of a single independent variable with two levels (organizational lay 
theory of intelligence: entity and incremental). Two separate analyses (i.e., excluding vs. 
including covariates) were conducted for all primary measures: an independent-samples t-test 
and one-way ANCOVA.14  
Manipulation Checks 
 As in Study 1, participants accurately perceived the clubs’ lay theory of intelligence. In 
particular, the entity club was perceived as endorsing more entity beliefs (M = 3.68, SD = 1.45) 
than the incremental club (M = 1.69, SD = 0.64), t(196) = 12.42, p < .001, d = 1.78. Also, 
participants generally were able to accurately recall the organizational lay theory condition to 
which they had been assigned. More than 90% of participants (n = 180) correctly remembered 
the Project (Smart or Learn) that had been presented in the meeting minutes.  
Actual Performance and Number Attempted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For the measures of cheating frequency, a chi-square test was conducted, excluding covariates.  
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 Similar to Study 1, participants completed approximately 5 items correctly on the 
problem-solving task (M = 4.30, SD = 2.27, range: 0-9). Furthermore, participants generally 
attempted virtually all of the items (M = 17.10, SD = 2.20, range: 7-18). 
New to Study 2, participants who learned about the entity and incremental contexts did 
not significantly differ in their actual performance or number attempted on the problem-solving 
task. Learning about the entity or incremental organization did not influence the number of items 
participants actually answered correctly (without covariates: t(196) = -.54, p = .59, d = .07; with 
covariates: F(1, 171) = .6715, p = .72, η2p = .001). Similarly, the organization’s lay beliefs about 
intelligence did not impact the number of items that participants attempted (without covariates: 
t(196) = -.56, p = .58, d = .08; with covariates: F(1, 171) = .5116, p = .48, η2p = .003).  
Perceived Organizational Goals 
 Next, I explored whether the two organizations were perceived to value performance and 
mastery goals differently. Results were generally consistent with hypotheses. First, participants 
perceived the entity club (M = 1.50, SD = 1.01) to endorse performance-avoidant goals (i.e., 
avoiding failure) more than the incremental club (M = 1.13, SD = 0.89), t(196) = 2.71, p = .007, 
d = .39 (with covariates: F(1, 171) = 5.49, p = .02, η2p = .03, see Table 7 for means). Also, 
participants perceived the two clubs as similarly valuing performance-approach goals (i.e., 
achieving success), (without covariates: t(196) = 1.18, p = .24, d = .16; with covariates: F(1, 171) 
= 2.6317, p = .11, η2p = .02). Finally, as predicted, the incremental organization (M = 3.41, SD = 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 There was a marginal main effect of cheating beliefs, F(1, 171) = 3.37, p = .07, η2p = .02: 
people who believed that cheating was more acceptable performed worse on the task. 
16 A main effect of past performance also emerged, F(1, 171) = 6.18, p = .01, η2p = .04, such that 
participants who performed better in the past attempted fewer items on the task. 
17 A marginal main effect of past performance emerged, F(1, 171) = 3.74, p = .06, η2p = .02, such 
that those with lower past performance perceived that the organization valued performance-
approach goals more. 
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0.43) was perceived as endorsing mastery goals more compared to the entity one (M = 3.19, SD 
= 0.59), t(196) = -2.94, p =.004, d = .43 (with covariates: F(1, 171) = 4.9518, p = .03, η2p = .03; 
see Table 7 for means).  
In sum, participants perceived the entity and incremental clubs as endorsing very 
different goals. As hypothesized, the entity club was viewed as valuing performance more than 
the incremental one; in contrast, the incremental club was perceived as valuing mastery more 
than the entity one. Moreover, these results suggest that distinguishing between performance-
avoidance and performance-approach goals may be important (Elliot, 1999). In particular, 
participants perceived the entity club as concerned more with avoiding failure—but not 
necessarily with achieving success—compared to the incremental club. 
Perceived Organizational Cheating Norms 
Did people also believe that the entity and incremental clubs had different norms about 
cheating? To test this possibility, I separately examined whether participants perceived the entity 
and incremental clubs as differing in how common cheating tended to be among its members 
(i.e., a pro-cheating descriptive norm) and how accepting the clubs were of cheating (i.e., a pro-
cheating injunctive norm).  
Consistent with hypotheses, participants perceived cheating to be more common in the 
entity club (M = 0.66, SD = 0.50) compared to the incremental club (M = 0.49, SD = 0.48), 
t(196) = 2.40, p =.02, d = .35. This effect remained significant when including covariates, F(1, 
171) = 4.67, p = .03, η2p = .03 (see Table 6 for means). In contrast, participants perceived the 
two clubs as similarly (un)accepting of cheating, t(196) = 1.45, p = .15, d = .21 (with covariates: 
F(1, 171) = 2.49, p = .12, η2p = .01; see Table 6 for means). Taken together, both clubs were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 There was also a marginal effect of personal lay theory, F(1, 171) = 2.79, p = .10, η2p = .02: 
entity theorists perceived that the club valued mastery less. 
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perceived to be similarly unaccepting of cheating; yet, as hypothesized, cheating was perceived 
as significantly more common in the entity (vs. incremental) club.  
Performance-Contingent Self-Worth and State Self-Esteem 
Did the organizations’ beliefs about intelligence influence how participants viewed 
themselves in the moment? More specifically, did participants report more self-doubt (i.e., 
greater performance-contingent self-worth and lower state self-esteem) when considering the 
entity (vs. incremental) organization? Results revealed that participants did not differ in their 
performance-contingent self-worth, t(196) = -.93, p = .36, d  = .14, or state-self esteem, t(196) 
= .01, p = .99, d  < .001, after learning about the entity and incremental organizations. Moreover, 
these effects remained nonsignificant when covariates were included (performance-contingent 
self-worth: F(1, 171) = 2.00, p = .16, η2p = .01; state self-esteem: F(1, 171) = .0419, p = .84, η2p 
< .001). In sum, merely being exposed to the organizations’ beliefs about intelligence did not 
negatively impact participants’ self-worth and self-esteem. 
Cheating Measures 
Descriptive statistics. Approximately 38% of participants (n = 75) misreported their 
performance on the task—somewhat more than in Study 1 (30%). Moreover, approximately 26% 
of participants (n = 51) self-enhanced by inflating their performance on the task—a noticeable 
increase from Study 1 (18%). Additionally, fewer than 12% of participants (n = 23) misreported 
their number attempted on the task. Specifically, approximately 6.5% of participants (n = 13) 
inflated the number of items they attempted, whereas 5% of participants (n = 10) downplayed 
their number attempted. In sum, although few participants misreported their effort on the task, 
nearly 40% of participants cheated on the task to enhance their perceived performance.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A main effect of cheating beliefs did emerge: F(1, 171) = 8.48, p = .004, η2p = .05, such that 
participants who believed that cheating was more acceptable reported lower state self-esteem. 
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Cheating about performance. Did participants cheat more when the club endorsed an 
entity (vs. incremental) lay theory? Consistent with hypotheses, participants inflated their 
performance to a marginally greater extent after learning about the entity club (M = 0.72, SD = 
2.18) compared to those who learned about the incremental club (M = 0.26, SD = 1.68), t(196) = 
1.68, p =.10, d = .24. When covariates were included in the analysis, this difference became 
nonsignificant, F(1, 171) = 1.72, p = .19, η2p =.01. Importantly, no covariates significantly 
predicted the outcome, all ps > .14; thus this change in significance was likely due to reduced 
statistical power, perhaps due to participants’ limited reporting of SAT/ACT score. In summary, 
Study 2 revealed marginal support for the hypothesis that people cheat more about their 
performance in entity (vs. incremental) contexts when faced with a difficult task. In particular, 
participants in the entity condition cheated marginally more than those in the incremental 
condition; however, this effect only emerged when covariates were not included in the 
analyses.20  
Cheating about number attempted. Next, I examined whether the organization’s lay 
theory impacted participants’ degree of cheating about their number attempted. Results revealed 
that participants who learned about the two clubs did not differ in their number of items 
attempted (without covariates: t(196) = -.31, p = .76, d = .05; with covariates: F(1, 171) = 0.38, p 
= .54, η2p = .002). In other words, when faced with a demanding task, participants did not self-
enhance by downplaying their number attempted more when performing for the entity (vs. 
incremental) club.21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Fifty-one participants inflated their performance on the task (cell size ranges: 21-30). 
Importantly, the main effect of organizational lay theory was not significant, χ2(1) = 1.68, p = 
.20. That is, participants self-enhanced at similar rates in the two contexts. 
21 Only 13 participants inflated and 10 participants downplayed their number attempted on the 
problem-solving task (cell size ranges: 5-8 and 3-7, respectively). The chi-square tests did not 
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Mediation Analyses: What Drives Cheating Behavior in Entity and Incremental Contexts? 
   Finally, I investigated whether an organization’s perceived norms and goals explained 
participants’ cheating behavior.22 To do so, I used Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4). 
Use of this macro allowed me to test whether participants inflated their performance marginally 
more in the entity (vs. incremental) environment because they perceived cheating to be more 
common (and marginally more accepted) there and/or because they perceived the organization to 
endorse performance-avoidance goals more and mastery goals less. For each analysis, the 
organization’s lay theory was entered as the independent variable (X); perceptions of the 
organization’s descriptive norms, injunctive norms, performance-avoidance goals, performance-
approach goals, and mastery goals were entered simultaneously as mediators23 (M). Finally, 
participants’ degree of cheating about their performance was entered as the dependent variable 
(Y). Because of power concerns, no covariates were included. All analyses included 10,000 
bootstrapped samples; 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals are reported. 
Consistent with the t-test results reported previously, the club’s lay theory was a 
significant predictor of its perceived descriptive norms (p = .02), performance-avoidance goals (p 
= .007), and mastery goals (p = .004) but not its perceived injunctive norms (p = .15) or 
performance-approach goals (p = .24). Results also revealed that only the organizational lay 
theory condition—and none of the mediators—predicted participants’ degree of cheating (p 
= .05; all mediators ps > .13). Moreover, none of the indirect effects through any of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reveal any significant effects when separately exploring participants’ inflation and downplaying 
of their number attempted, p = .43 and .17, respectively. 
22 Participants’ self-judgments were not included in the mediation model because they were not 
consistently affected by the organizational lay theory manipulation. Notably, inclusion of them in 
the mediation model did not change the pattern of results reported. 
23 Analyses were also conducted to test the indirect effect for each mediating variable separately. 
These results did not differ from the analyses that tested the mediating variables simultaneously. 
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mediators were significant (see Table 8 for 95% confidence intervals). In other words, although 
the organization’s lay theory predicted their perceived norms, goals, and participants’ cheating 
behavior, perceptions of the organizations’ norms and goals did not explain why people cheated 
more about their performance in the entity (vs. incremental) context. 
Liking of the Club: An Alternative Hypothesis 
 Finally, I tested an alternative hypothesis—that differences in cheating behavior in the 
entity and incremental contexts were instead driven primarily by a negativity bias toward the 
entity club. First, I sought to replicate past research that demonstrated that people preferred 
incremental organizations to entity ones (Emerson & Murphy, 2015a; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). 
Mirroring this work, results revealed that participants preferred the incremental club (M = 2.29, 
SD = 0.63) to the entity one (M = 1.95, SD = 0.81), t(196) = -3.22, p =.001, d = .47 (with 
covariates: F(1, 171) = 6.49, p = .01,24 η2p =.04; see Table 9 for means).  
 I next examined whether people cheated more in the entity context because they 
preferred it less. Given that none of the proposed mediators statistically mediated participants’ 
cheating, it was possible instead that people cheated more in the entity (vs. incremental) club 
because they liked it less. However, liking of the club did not predict participants’ degree of 
cheating about their performance (p > .99), nor did it mediate the relationship between the 
organization’s lay theory and participants’ degree of cheating about their performance (effect 
= .0003, SE = .09, 95% CI: = -.22 to .16). Taken together, the results provided no support for the 
alternative explanation that people cheated more frequently and to a greater degree in entity 
contexts simply because they perceived it more negatively than they did the incremental one. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 A marginal main effect of cheating beliefs also emerged, F(1, 171) = 3.78, p = .05, η2p = .02, 
such that participants who were more accepting of cheating liked the organization less. 
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Study 2 Discussion 
 Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 in several meaningful ways. First, I found 
marginal support for my primary hypothesis: when faced with a demanding task, participants 
who learned about the entity club tended to self-enhance by inflating their performance more 
compared to those who learned about the incremental club. This finding suggests that the null 
results in Study 1 may have resulted from a lack of statistical power. By doubling the sample size 
in Study 2, the predicted effect marginally emerged.  
 Study 2 was also the first known research to establish how people perceive entity and 
incremental organizations. As hypothesized, participants perceived the entity (vs. incremental) 
club as endorsing performance goals more—in particular, performance-avoidance goals—and 
perceived the incremental (vs. entity) club as endorsing mastery goals more. These findings 
suggest that the entity club’s belief that intelligence and ability are fixed traits led participants to 
view the club as more focused on performance and results, and, in particular, with people 
avoiding failure—a sure sign, according to an entity organization, that a person lacks smarts and 
natural talent. The incremental club, on the other hand, was perceived to value self-improvement 
and mastery; qualities that an organization might be expected to value when it believes that 
intelligence can be expanded over time with sufficient effort and motivation.  
The results underscored the value of separately examining the relationship between 
organizational lay theories and performance-avoidant and performance-approach goals. Despite 
the theoretical distinction in coping and self-esteem patterns that is associated with these types of 
performance goals (Elliot, 1999), much of lay theories research has measured only one type of 
performance goal (e.g., Bong, 2008) or has conceptualized these goals as interchangeable 
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988). By examining the relationship between 
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organizational lay theories and performance-avoidance and performance-approach goals 
separately, I found that the entity and incremental organizations were viewed as differing more 
in their value of avoiding failure rather than of achieving success. 
 The current study was also the first to examine the effects of organizational lay theories 
of intelligence on perceived norms—a group-level phenomenon that could not previously be 
examined in research on personal lay theories of intelligence. Although cheating was perceived 
as unaccepted in both the entity and incremental clubs, it was perceived as more common in the 
entity (vs. incremental) club. In other words, participants seemed to believe that an entity 
organization’s fixed beliefs about intelligence and demonstrating success did not necessarily 
condone cheating; yet, these beliefs were perceived as leading others in the organization to cheat 
as a defensive self-enhancement strategy when faced with a difficult task. 
 The results of Study 2 did not provide support for the position that merely learning about 
an entity organization leads to greater self-doubt. Indeed, organizational lay theories of 
intelligence did not predict participants’ self-judgments—people reported similar levels of 
performance-contingent self-worth and self-esteem after learning about the entity and 
incremental clubs. These findings suggest that people may only experience drops in self-worth 
and self-esteem after failure, a possibility that is mirrored in past work on entity theorists (Hong 
et al., 2009; Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008).  Taken together, the results of Study 2 suggest that 
perceptions of an organization’s norms and goals—rather than feelings of personal self-worth—
are influenced by exposure to an organization’s fixed or malleable views of intelligence. 
Finally, no evidence emerged to suggest that differences in the psychological 
mechanisms assessed in Study 2 explained the increased levels of cheating in the entity (vs. 
incremental) organization. The entity (vs. incremental) club was liked less by participants, was 
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perceived as endorsing performance-avoidance goals more and mastery goals less, and was an 
environment in which cheating was perceived to be more common. However, the mediation 
results would suggest that other psychological processes may underlie the cheating behavior. 
This possibility is considered further in the general discussion. Nevertheless, Study 2 revealed 
important differences in how people perceive and behave in entity and incremental organizations. 
Study 3 
In Study 2, I found preliminary evidence that participants self-enhanced by cheating more 
after applying to an entity, compared to an incremental, organization when faced with a 
demanding task. However, what might happen if their future in the organization were less 
tenuous—that is, would participants still cheat after being told that they had already performed 
well and were admitted into the club? 
 One possibility is that people would cheat less after being accepted into the club, 
regardless of its beliefs about intelligence. Perceiving that attractive others accept us is affirming, 
and has been shown to boost feelings of belonging, temper perceptions of threat, buffer against 
stress, and reduce defensive responding (Creswell et al., 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 2002; 
Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000; Steele, 1988). Being admitted into the club based on one’s 
past performance may temper participants’ evaluative concerns—even when they do not meet 
the high performance standard of a new task. Thus, to the extent that being accepted by the club 
is affirming, we might expect little to no cheating among participants after they have been 
accepted into the club. 
Yet, affirmation may not be enough for people to feel comfortable in entity contexts. 
Entity theorists and those with performance goals exhibit defensive actions when they experience 
a single failure, even after a string of successes (e.g., Hong et al., 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; 
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Sideridis & Kaplan, 2011). Likewise, people in an entity organization might cheat when faced 
with a demanding task even after success because of how they expect the organization to 
construe failure. According to an entity theory, if one possesses intelligence, they should always 
perform well—and any instance of low performance may indicate that they lack ability (e.g., 
Diener & Dweck, 1978; 1980; Hong et al., 1999). Therefore, people in an entity context may 
never feel fully affirmed—they may believe that the only way to demonstrate that they are smart 
and talented is by performing well, and might worry that even a single instance of struggle will 
be interpreted by the entity organization as evidence that they lack ability.  
People in incremental environments may be significantly less affected by feedback—be it 
positive or negative. Why might this be? Because of an incremental organization’s emphasis on  
self-improvement and mastery, people in incremental (vs. entity) organizations may be less 
concerned with appearing smart to others and instead may be more driven to grow and improve 
over time (Murphy & Dweck, 2010; Study 2 of the current work). Indeed, research with 
incremental theorists and those with mastery goals has shown that this focus on self-
improvement leads them to respond with more remedial actions after failure, such as putting in 
more time and attempting to learn from their mistakes rather than simply inflating their 
performance for self-enhancement and self-presentation purposes (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007; 
Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008; Study 2 of the current work). Moreover, even after success, 
incremental theorists tend to show sustained motivation and persistence rather than rest on the 
laurels of their past achievements (Sideridis & Kaplan, 2011). Likewise, people in incremental 
organizations may be more driven to show growth on difficult tasks over time rather than self-
enhance to create the illusion of sustained high performance. In sum, we might expect that 
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people would cheat more when faced with difficulty in an entity (vs. incremental) context even 
after receiving praise from the organization.   
Importantly, research on praise suggests that the type of positive affirmation that people 
receive can also impact their cheating behavior. One type of praise, person praise, focuses on 
people’s traits and abilities (Henderlong & Lepper, 2002; Kamins & Dweck, 1999). Person 
praise attributes a person’s single good performance to a more global trait within them. That is, 
when one performs well, they are extolled as “smart” or “gifted;” in contrast, when they perform 
poorly, they are deemed “unintelligent” or, like at Enron, “not bright enough to get it.” Person 
praise, particularly from esteemed or attractive groups, leads to high levels of self-doubt and 
discomfort because one may worry that they will be seen as lacking ability—or even worth and 
value as a person—if they cannot maintain high performance (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Skipper 
& Douglas, 2012; Zentall & Morris, 2012). Indeed, person praise has been linked to more 
helpless responding, including higher rates of cheating in the face of difficulty (Blackwell et al., 
2007; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998).  
A very different form of praise, process praise, focuses on one’s effort and strategies 
(Henderlong & Lepper, 2002; Kamins & Dweck, 1999). Instead of tying performance to internal 
traits, process praise attributes good performance to diligence, motivation, persistence, or the use 
of effective strategies. Similarly, poor performance is the result of insufficient effort, motivation, 
or appropriate strategies. Process praise links performance to qualities that are generally thought 
to be more controllable—thus, people can recover from setbacks and failure if they change their 
approach or ramp up their effort. Moreover, attractive or esteemed groups that praise hard work 
and motivation are perceived as less threatening, particularly because one expects the group to 
construe any subsequent failure as a challenge that can be overcome rather than as an indictment 
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of their abilities. In fact, research has shown that people who receive process praise work harder, 
persist, and cheat less in the face of later setbacks (Blackwell et al., 2007; Kamins & Dweck, 
1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Skipper & Douglas, 2012; Zentall & Morris, 2012). 
Taken together, we might expect that participants who do not meet a performance 
standard in an entity organization may self-enhance by cheating more compared to those in an 
incremental organization. Yet, above and beyond this main effect, the primary goal of Study 3 
was to examine how the type of praise that people receive might moderate their cheating 
behavior in entity and incremental contexts. In particular, if the goal of people in an entity 
context is to demonstrate their natural talent—even after positive feedback—how they 
demonstrate their talent may be influenced by the type of praise they receive. That is, if an entity 
organization perceive that abilities are fixed, then people in that environment may be more likely 
to self-enhance the trait that was praised to confirm that they possess it. After receiving person 
praise, people in entity environments may strive to continue to display their intelligence. Thus, 
they may be particularly likely to self-enhance by inflating their performance to prove that they 
have the talent that the organization originally praised. In contrast, after receiving process praise, 
people in entity environments may be more likely to inflate their effort; if an entity organization 
believes that people either “have it or they do not,” and they value effort and perseverance, then 
people may be driven to show that they possess these valued traits. 
In summary, I predicted that people would still cheat more on a demanding task in an 
entity (vs. incremental) context, even after being affirmed by their past performance. However, I 
also hypothesized that the type of praise that people received from the entity context—but not 
the incremental context—would moderate the type of self-enhancing that they exhibited. 
Therefore, the study was a 2 (organizational lay theory: entity, incremental) X 2 (praise type: 
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process, person) between-subjects design. If people receive person praise from an entity 
organization, I hypothesized that they would be particularly likely to inflate their performance; 
yet, if people receive process praise from an entity organization, I hypothesized that they would 
be particularly likely to inflate their number attempted.  
A final goal of Study 3 was to explore a downstream consequence of being in an 
incremental context. The focus of Studies 1 and 2 was on cheating—a behavior that people were 
predicted to do less in incremental, compared to entity, environments. Yet, what behavior might 
people exhibit more in incremental contexts?  Both incremental theories and process praise have 
been linked to more positive, effortful strategies in response to difficulty or failure—like 
persistence—compared to entity theories and person praise (Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Nussbaum 
& Dweck, 2008; Skipper & Douglas, 2012). Thus, people in incremental environments may 
show greater task persistence in the face of difficulty than those in entity environments. I 
included a measure of persistence in Study 3: providing participants with the opportunity to 
spend additional time on the task. I expected that people who received process praise in the 
incremental organization would show the greatest persistence by opting to spend the most 
additional time on it. In contrast, I predicted that people who received person praise from the 
entity organization would want to downplay their persistence most and thus would opt to spend 
the least additional time on the problem-solving task. 
Study 3 Method 
Participants   
 Two hundred fifty three undergraduate participants were recruited from introductory 
psychology courses at Indiana University and participated in exchange for partial course credit. 
A power analysis was conducted on the results of Study 2 to estimate the sample size needed to 
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replicate the result. This analysis suggested that approximately 550 participants (~275 per 
condition) be collected to find the predicted main effect of organizational lay theory to achieve 
80% power; however, due to issues with time and participant availability, only approximately 
250 participants in total could be recruited for Study 3. 
The same exclusion criteria from Studies 1 and 2 were used in the current study. Sixteen 
participants did not write their responses to the problem-solving task on the paper answer sheet 
(i.e., did not provide a response on the primary dependent variable). Additionally, 18 participants 
completed 10 or more items correctly and thus did not experience the performance standard as 
intended. After excluding these participants, 221 participants remained in the sample. (Cell sizes 
ranged from 50 to 58.)  
 The sample contained 145 self-identified women and 75 self-identified men (1 did not 
self-identify their gender). The racial breakdown of the sample was: 170 White/Caucasian, 24 
Black/African American, 6 Asian American/Pacific Islander, 2 Latino/a, 1 Middle Eastern, and 
15 Bi/Multiracial (3 did indicate their race). The sample contained 122 freshmen, 55 sophomores, 
25 juniors, 17 seniors, and 1 “other” (1 did not indicate their school year.) 
Procedure 
 The procedure from Study 1 was used in Study 3, with three noteworthy differences. 
Again, participants learned about the club (including its organizational lay theory) and completed 
the member application. However, first participants learned that they have already been accepted 
into the organization based on their responses to the mass-testing pre-screening survey. The 
reason for their acceptance served as the praise manipulation (described in greater detail below). 
To maintain the cover story, the in-lab member application and problem-solving tasks were 
described as “orientation tasks” that all new members do (rather than as application tasks). Thus, 
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participants in Study 3 completed the same primary tasks as in Studies 1 and 2; however, the 
ostensible purpose of the tasks was to follow the procedures of all new members into the club. 
Second, as in Study 2, all participants learned that club members typically obtained high 
scores on the task (i.e., that the performance standard was high). Again, learning about this 
higher performance standard created a more demanding, higher-stakes testing context.  
Finally, new to Study 3, participants completed two additional measures. They were 
given the opportunity to report whether they would like to continue working on the task—the 
measure of task persistence. Also, they completed a manipulation check to assess their memory 
of the praise manipulation (both described in more detail below). 
Materials  
The meeting minutes, member application, performance standard information, and 
problem-solving task were identical to Study 2.  
Praise manipulation.  The praise manipulation was adapted from past work on the 
effects of praise on cheating and defensive behavior (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 
1998; Zentall & Morris, 2012). Before completing their member application, participants learned 
they had been accepted into the club, ostensibly based on their responses in the pre-screening 
survey. All participants were told that they were selected for admission into the XYZ club due to 
their past success on dimensions that are relevant to the club, including academics and/or 
volunteering. Critically, the praise manipulation was embedded in the attributions that were 
made for this acceptance. In the person praise condition, participants were told that their past 
academic performance indicated that they possess the “talent and natural ability” necessary to 
succeed in the XYZ club. In the process praise condition, participants were told that their past 
academic performance indicated that they possessed the “hard work and persistence” necessary 
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to succeed in the club. Thus, all participants were told that they had performed well in the past; 
however, the praise manipulation highlighted either their natural talent or their hard work as the 
reason for that good performance and, subsequently, their club acceptance. 
Primary Measures 
 All pre-measures (i.e., covariate measures) were identical to those described in Studies 1 
and 2: personal lay theory of intelligence (α = .91), SAT/ACT score, and personal beliefs about 
cheating acceptability (α = .80). Additionally, the following study measures were the same as 
those described in Studies 1 and 2: organizational lay theory manipulation checks (perceived 
organizational lay theory: α = .96), demographic information, computer-recorded number correct 
and number attempted, measure of cheating degree, and measures of cheating frequency. Study 3 
had two new measures: the praise manipulation check and the task persistence measure. 
 Persistence measure. Immediately after participants completed the problem-solving task 
they completed the new persistence measure. They were told that participants often finished the 
study with as many as 10 minutes left at the end of the session. The researcher explained that 
they might have the option to spend this additional time on the problem-solving task, either 
answering questions that they did not get to or reviewing the responses they had provided. 
Importantly, participants were told that even though they had received the error message, the 
researcher could restart the computer and thus they could continue the task by referencing the 
answers they had written down. The experimenter left participants alone to indicate on a sheet of 
paper the number of minutes (0-10) that they would like to spend on the task. After completing 
the persistence measure, participants were told that they would not have enough time to continue 
with the task, and proceeded with the rest of the study. Persistence was assessed as the number of 
additional minutes participants indicate wanting to work on the problem-solving task. 
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Praise manipulation check. At the conclusion of the study, participants were reminded 
that they were admitted to the club because of information that they provided during the pre-
measure survey. They were asked to recall the explanation for their acceptance into the club. The 
responses that participants could select from were “talent and natural ability,” “hard work and 
persistence,” or “I was not selected for admission to the club.” 
Study 3 Results 
Research Design and Analysis Overview 
 The study was a 2 (organizational lay theory: entity, incremental) X 2 (praise type: 
person, process) between-subjects design. As in Studies 1 and 2, separate analyses were 
conducted without and with covariates. Specifically, both a 2 X 2 between-subjects ANOVA and 
ANCOVA were conducted. 25   
Manipulation Checks 
 As in Studies 1 and 2, the manipulation had its intended effect—the entity organization 
was perceived as endorsing more entity beliefs (M = 3.87, SD = 1.41) compared to the 
incremental organization (M = 1.68, SD = 0.66), F(2, 217) = 215.16, p < .001, η2p = .50. No 
other effects were significant, all ps > .49. Participants were also able to accurately recall the 
organizational lay theory condition to which they had been assigned. Only 12 participants (or 
5.43%) were unable to accurately recall the Project (i.e., Smart or Learn) that had been presented 
in the meeting minutes. Surprisingly, 81 participants (or 36.65%) did not correctly remember the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For all analyses of cheating frequency, a 2 X 2 generalized linear model test (GLM; with a 
logit link function and binomial probability distribution) was conducted without covariates.   
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type of praise that they had received. This error rate was similar in the person praise (N = 44) and 
process praise (N = 37) conditions.26  
Actual Performance and Number Attempted 
 Similar to Studies 1 and 2, participants correctly answered approximately 5 items on the 
problem-solving task (M = 4.41, SD = 2.31, range: 0-9) and generally attempted all of the items 
(M = 17.27, SD = 1.88, range: 9-18).  
New in this study, the organizations’ lay theory of intelligence influenced participants’ 
actual performance on the problem-solving task. Specifically, participants answered fewer items 
correctly (i.e., underperformed) after learning about the entity organization (M = 4.09, SD = 
2.16) compared to the incremental one (M = 4.75, SD = 2.42), F(1, 217) = 4.69, p = .03, η2p 
= .02. No other effects were significant, all ps > .44. This main effect remained significant when 
including covariates, F(1, 184) = 4.3727, p = .04, η2p =.02 (see Table 10 for means).  
 For actual number attempted, the only effect that emerged was a marginal organizational 
lay theory x praise type interaction, F(1, 217) = 3.70, p = .06, η2p = .02 (see Figure 1). Among 
participants in the entity context, those who received person praise attempted marginally more 
items (M = 17.60, SD = 1.33) than those who received process praise (M = 17.00, SD = 2.38), 
F(1, 217) = 2.86, p = .09. Among participants who learned about the incremental club, praise 
type did not moderate participants’ number attempted (person praise: M = 17.04, SD = 2.12; 
process praise: M = 17.41, SD = 1.49), F(1, 217) = 1.04, p = .31. Decomposing the interaction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Because of the large number of participants that failed the praise manipulation check, all 
primary analyses were conducted both including and excluding people who failed at least one 
manipulation check. Generally, results did not differ; however, in some instances, excluding the 
participants that failed caused significant effects to become nonsignificant. Because this change 
in significance likely occurred because of a reduction in power, I chose to report analyses that 
included these participants—mirroring the analyses in Studies 1 and 2.  
27 The only other effect to emerge was a main effect of past performance, F(1, 184) = 5.87, p 
= .02, η2p = .03: people with a higher SAT/ACT score performed better on the task. 
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the other way revealed that people’s number attempted in the entity and incremental clubs did 
not differ after receiving person praise, F(1, 217) = 2.38, p = .12, or after receiving process 
praise, F(1, 217) = 1.41, p = .24. No other effects were significant, all ps > .66. An examination 
of the means revealed that participants who received person praise from the entity organization 
attempted the most items. That is, participants appeared to have exerted the most effort when the 
implications of failure for their abilities was likely perceived to be the most severe—in the entity 
context after being praised for their “natural abilities.”  
 When all covariates were included, the marginal interaction remained, F(1, 184) = 3.4828, 
p = .06, η2p = .02 (see Table 11 for means). Again, the only difference to emerge was among 
those who received person praise: within these conditions, those who read about the entity club 
persisted marginally more than those who read about the incremental club, F(1, 184) = 3.03, p 
= .08. Again, participants attempted the greatest number of items after receiving person praise 
from the entity organization. In sum, participants performed the best after learning about the 
incremental (vs. entity) organization. However, participants tended to attempt the most items in 
the entity organization following person praise.   
Cheating Measures 
Descriptive statistics. Generally, participants cheated at similar rates as in Studies 1 and 
2. Approximately 35% of participants (n = 78) misreported their performance. Moreover, just 
over 24% of participants (n = 54) self-enhanced by inflating their performance on the task (i.e., 
by claiming to have answered at least one more item correctly than they actually did). Mirroring 
Study 2, about 13% of participants (n = 29) misreported their number attempted. Specifically, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 A marginal main effect of participant’s lay theory also emerged, F(1, 184) = 3.96, p = .05, η2p 
= .02. Consistent with past work, participants who personally endorsed more fixed beliefs 
persisted less on the task. 
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about 5% (n = 11) inflated their attempts, whereas just over 8% (n = 18) downplayed their 
attempts. Like the first two studies, most participants accurately reported their number attempted; 
however, about 25% of participants inflated their performance on the task. 
Cheating about performance. Did an organization’s lay theory and praise type impact 
the degree to which participants misreported their performance? Results revealed a main effect 
of organizational lay theory, F(1, 217) = 4.49, p = .04, η2p = .02. As expected, participants 
inflated their performance more in entity club (M = 0.67, SD = 1.79) compared to the 
incremental club (M = 0.19, SD = 1.81). This main effect was qualified by the predicted 
interaction, F(1, 217) = 4.49, p = .04, η2p = .02 (see Figure 2). Simple effects revealed that after 
learning about the entity club, participants inflated their performance marginally more after 
receiving person praise (M = 0.98, SD = 2.00) compared to process praise (M = 0.38, SD = 1.53), 
F(1, 217) = 3.07, p = .08. In contrast, after learning about the incremental club, participants 
cheated to a similar degree after receiving person (M = -.04, SD = 2.01) and process praise (M = 
0.38, SD = 1.61), F(1, 217) = 1.22, p = .27.  
Next, I decomposed the interaction the other way to examine the effects of praise 
condition. After receiving person praise, participants inflated their performance more in the 
entity (vs. incremental) club, F(1, 217) = 8.64, p = .004. However, after receiving process praise, 
participants misrepresented their performance at similar rates in the entity and incremental 
contexts, F(1, 217) = .001, p > .99. Consistent with predictions, participants self-enhanced by 
inflating their performance most (i.e., cheated most) after receiving person praise in the entity 
context. Participants cheated to a similar, lower degree in the other three conditions. 
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When covariates were included in the analysis, the organizational lay theory main effect 
became marginal, F(1, 184) = 3.5229, p = .06, η2p = .02. Again, people cheated marginally more 
about their performance when they were told that club endorsed an entity (vs. incremental) lay 
theory of intelligence (M = 0.74, SD = 1.83 and M = 0.23, SD = 1.88, respectively). Importantly, 
the organizational lay theory x praise type interaction remained significant, F(1, 184) = 5.90, p 
= .02, η2p = .03. Generally, the same pattern of effects emerged (see Table 12 for means). 
Participants in the entity context cheated marginally more after receiving person (vs. process) 
praise, F(1, 184) = 2.58, p = .11. Unexpectedly, participants in the incremental context cheated 
marginally less after receiving person (vs. process) praise, F(1, 184) = 2.78, p = .10. Also, 
participants who received person praise cheated more after learning about the entity (vs. 
incremental) club, F(1, 184) = 8.72, p = .004; conversely, those who received process praise 
cheated to a similar degree in the two contexts, F(1, 184) = 0.15, p = .70. In conclusion, 
participants cheated to the greatest degree after receiving person praise in the entity context. 
However, participants also appeared to (marginally) cheat the least after receiving process praise 
in the incremental context. 30  
Cheating about number attempted. Next, I explored whether the organization’s lay 
theory or praise type influenced participants’ degree of cheating about their number attempted. 
The only effect to emerge was a marginal organizational lay theory x praise type interaction, F(1, 
217) = 2.79, p = .10, η2p = .02 (see Figure 3). Consistent with hypotheses, participants in the 
entity context who received process praise misreported their number attempted to a marginally 
greater degree (M = -0.72, SD = 2.79) compared to those in the same context who received 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 A main effect of cheating beliefs also emerged, F(1, 184) = 5.73, p = .02, η2p = .03. As 
expected, participants who were more accepting of cheating inflated their performance more. 
30 Fifty-four participants inflated their performance on the problem-solving task (cell size ranges: 
10-19). Results of the GLM test revealed no significant main effects or interaction, all ps > .19. 
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person praise (M = -0.11, SD = 1.07), F(1, 217) = 3.35, p = .07. Interestingly, an examination of 
the means revealed that those who received process (vs. person) praise under-reported their 
number attempted more—they claimed that they attempted fewer items than they actually did. In 
contrast, among those who learned about the incremental organization, praise type did not 
influence participants’ degree of cheating about their attempts (person praise: M = -0.40, SD = 
1.41; process praise: M = -0.21, SD = 1.29), F(1, 217) = 0.34, p = .56. 
Decomposing the interaction the other way revealed that among those who received 
person praise, participants cheated to a similar degree in the entity and incremental clubs, F(1, 
217) = 0.74, p = .39. Similarly, among those who received process praise, participants cheated to 
a similar degree in the two contexts, F(1, 217) = 2.41, p = .12.  
When covariates were included in the analyses, the marginal interaction remained, F(1, 
184) = 2.80, p = .10, η2p = .015 (see Table 13 for means). Mirroring the pattern without 
covariates, praise marginally moderated participants’ cheating in the entity context, F(1, 184) = 
3.21, p = .08, but not in the incremental context, F(1, 184) = 0.38, p = .54. The cheating behavior 
of participants who received person praise was not affected by organizational lay theory, F(1, 
184) = 0.46, p = .50. However, new to this analysis—and consistent with predictions—
participants who received process praise cheated to a greater degree about their number 
attempted in the entity (vs. incremental) context, F(1, 184) = 2.80, p = .10. In sum, participants 
who received process praise in the entity context cheated about their number attempted to a 
greater degree than those in the other three conditions. Unexpectedly, participants in this 
condition actually under-reported their attempts to the greatest degree. That is, when participants’ 
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hard work and perseverance were praised by the entity organization, they were most likely to 
downplay their number attempted. 31 
Task Persistence 
Study 3 included a new measure of task persistence—namely, how many additional 
minutes a participant could choose to spend on the problem-solving task. No effects emerged as 
significant, all ps > .24. This was likely due to a floor effect such that participants generally did 
not report wanting to spend more time on the task (all means < 2 out of 10 minutes). These 
effects remained nonsignificant when covariates were included in analyses, all ps > .17. In sum, 
participants’ willingness to spend additional time on the problem-solving task was not influenced 
by either the clubs’ belief about intelligence or the type of praise that they received. 
Study 3 Discussion 
  Study 3 revealed that an organization’s lay theory of intelligence shaped people’s 
cheating behavior even after receiving praise. Consistent with a moderation hypothesis, 
participants who received person praise from an entity organization inflated their performance to 
a greater degree than participants who either received process praise or received praise from an 
incremental organization. In other words, when participants’ smarts and talent were being 
praised by an organization that believed these traits were fixed, participants were most motivated 
to self-enhance their performance after failing to reach the performance standard.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 As reported above, 11 participants inflated and 18 downplayed their number attempted on the 
task (cell size ranges: 2-4 and 2-7, respectively). Neither manipulation nor their interaction 
predicted whether or not participants inflated their number attempted, all ps > .46. However, 
when considering only those who downplayed their number attempted, the predicted interaction 
was marginal, χ2(1) = 3.99, p = .05. In the entity context, more participants downplayed their 
number attempted after process (vs. person) praise, p = .05. Yet, in the incremental context, more 
participants did so after receiving person (vs. process) praise, p = .05. These results suggest that 
participants were more likely to downplay their number attempted when the organization’s lay 
theory and praise type were incongruent. However, given that fewer than 20 total participants 
under-reported their number attempted, these results should be interpreted with extreme caution. 
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  A more complex picture emerged around people’s misrepresentation of their effort. As 
predicted, participants misreported their number attempted most after receiving process praise 
from the entity club. I had predicted that participants would be most likely to inflate their number 
attempted after it was praised by an organization that perceived human characteristics as fixed. 
Instead, the pattern that emerged was inconsistent with predictions—participants were actually 
most likely to downplay their number attempted in this club when faced with difficulty.  
Why did participants choose this strategy? One possibility is that participants felt 
confused or suspicious after receiving process praise from an organization that clearly has fixed 
beliefs about intelligence. If the entity organization believes that smarts and talent are something 
that people either do or do not possess, then participants may have perceived being praised for 
one’s “hard work and perseverance” as a euphemism for telling them that they lack smarts or 
talent. By under-reporting their number attempted, participants may have been trying to 
contradict the organization’s impression of them by showing how well they could perform in a 
short time frame—thereby preserving the possibility that they could have done better if they had 
been able to complete all of the items. In other words, downplaying their effort on a demanding 
task may have been participants’ attempt to self-handicap (i.e., “I could have done better!”) in 
order to ultimately provide counter-evidence for the conciliatory process feedback (i.e., “I do 
possess the intelligence that you value!”).  
 Importantly, neither praise type nor organizational lay theory impacted the measure of 
task persistence used in Study 3. Generally, participants did not express interest in spending 
additional time on the problem-solving task, regardless of the organization’s beliefs about 
intelligence or the type of praise that they received from it. These results suggest that this 
measure of task persistence may not have been sufficiently sensitive to pick up differences in 
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participants’ desire or willingness to engage with the task. It is possible that a different measure 
of task persistence, such as measuring the amount of time participants spent on a similar but 
unsolvable task, may have been more successful in picking up differences in the two contexts. 
 In sum, Study 3 was the first study to provide evidence for the moderating role of praise 
type on the relationship between organizational lay theories and cheating behavior. These results 
counter traditional notions about the direct, positive relationship between positive affirmation 
and defensive responding (Steele, 1988). Moreover, it suggests a more complicated picture than 
past research on praise type. Researchers have consistently shown that process praise leads to 
less cheating than person praise; yet, in Study 3, this pattern occurred only when assessing 
participants’ degree of cheating about their performance in the entity context. An interesting 
implication of these findings is that the testing context typically used in praise research is 
perceived as an entity environment—as a context that values high performance without 
motivation and effort. Nevertheless, the results of Study 3 reveal that an organization’s lay 
theory can influence how different types of praise are construed, and in turn how they affect 
people’s cheating behavior in the face of difficulty.  
General Discussion 
  The current research was the first to investigate whether an organization’s lay theory of 
intelligence shapes people’s cheating behavior in a demanding testing environment. When 
participants failed to meet a high performance standard, I expected that they would worry that 
the entity organization might interpret their poor performance as evidence that they lack smarts 
and talent. This worry would in turn drive them to avoid failure at all costs, including by 
cheating on the high-stakes task. Conversely, I predicted that people would not experience these 
worries when faced with a demanding task in an incremental environment—an environment in 
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which self-improvement over time is particularly valued and failure is seen merely as a sign that 
one should put forth more effort or change one’s strategies. Thus, the primary prediction of the 
current work was that people would self-enhance more after poor performance in the entity (vs. 
incremental) context in the face of difficulty. In two of the three studies (S2 and S3), this 
hypothesis was supported: when participants failed to attain a high performance standard, they 
were at least marginally more likely to self-enhance by inflating their performance when they 
were expecting to be evaluated by the entity (vs. incremental) organization.  
 In addition to inflating their performance on the demanding task, participants seeking to 
self-enhance could have chosen to misreport their effort, or number attempted, in the entity 
context. That is, participant could have self-handicapped by under-reporting their number 
attempted, thereby preserving the possibility that they could have done better had they completed 
more items. Yet, across the three studies, participants in the entity and incremental contexts 
cheated about their number attempted to a similar (low) degree. In other words, when faced with 
a demanding testing context in the entity (vs. incremental) organization, participants opted to 
self-enhance by inflating their performance rather than self-handicap by downplaying their 
number attempted. 
The present work was also the first to explore how an organization’s lay theory of 
intelligence influenced perceptions of the group’s goals. Because entity organizations believe 
that smarts and giftedness are relatively stable, people might be concerned that a single failure 
would indicate to the organization that they lack these valued traits. Consistent with predictions, 
I found that participants perceived the entity organization to value avoiding failure (i.e., endorse 
performance-avoidance goals) more compared to the incremental organization. In contrast, 
incremental organizations believe that intelligence can be grown through motivation and effort, 
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and people in these contexts are driven to improve themselves and overcome challenges. As 
hypothesized, participants perceived the incremental organization to value learning new things 
(i.e., endorse mastery goals) more compared to the entity one. Notably, participants perceived 
that both contexts valued mastery more than performance—likely because the organization was 
an academic tutoring club. Nonetheless, the relative value that each organization was perceived 
to place on performance and mastery was consistent with its beliefs about intelligence.  
By considering the role of lay theories at the organizational level, the present research 
was able to explore the unique role of lay theories in shaping an important group-level variable: 
organizational norms. If people perceived that the entity organization placed the utmost value on 
unwavering high performance—and that the incremental organization placed a higher value on 
personal growth and perseverance—they might also expect cheating on high-stakes tasks to be 
more common and more accepted in the entity (vs. incremental) organization (Emerson & 
Murphy, 2015b; Emerson et al., 2014). Results revealed partial support for these predictions. 
Participants perceived the two organizations as similarly (un)accepting of cheating; however, 
cheating was perceived as more common in the entity (vs. incremental) organization. In sum, the 
current work provides us with two very different images of how entity and incremental 
organizations are perceived. On the one hand, the entity organization was perceived as an 
environment in which performing poorly should be avoided at all costs, and where cheating was 
widespread. On the other hand, the incremental organization was perceived as an environment 
that valued growing and learning from mistakes and where cheating was relatively uncommon.   
In addition to being perceived differently, entity and incremental organizations might also 
differ in the degree to which they elicit self-doubt. Indeed, much past work has found that entity 
(vs. incremental) theorists are more likely to tie their self-worth and self-esteem to their 
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performance because they believe that their ability to perform reflects an underlying trait that 
they do (or do not) possess (Burhans & Dweck, 1995; Henderson & Dweck, 1990; Nussbaum & 
Dweck, 2008). Likewise, it was possible that people would report higher levels of performance-
contingent self-worth and lower self-esteem in a context that endorses these fixed (vs. malleable) 
beliefs. The results of the current work did not support this hypothesis: participants’ self-worth 
and self-esteem were not affected by the organization’s lay theory. Yet, some research suggests 
that entity theorists only experience drops in their self-esteem and self-worth after performing 
poorly or receiving negative feedback (Elliott & Dweck, 1988; Hong et al., 2009). Indeed, 
participants in the current study might not have shown the predicted differences because they had 
not performed yet when their self-worth and self-esteem were assessed. Thus, one question for 
future research is whether people who perform poorly in entity contexts subsequently experience 
decrements to their self-worth and self-esteem. 
Despite differences in the entity and incremental organizations’ perceived goals and 
norms, these perceptions were not found to statistically mediate participants’ cheating behavior 
(S2). Moreover, there was no support for the alternative explanation that participants’ mere 
preference for the incremental (vs. entity) organization explained their cheating. Although 
participants liked the incremental organization more than the entity one, this preference did not 
mediate how much participants cheated. Thus, it is likely that another mechanism—and not 
perceptions of the organization’s norms or goals, or even participants’ general liking of the 
club—is responsible for participants’ cheating behavior, a point I return to later. 
Finally, the current research explored whether acceptance by an organization—in this 
case, by an esteemed and attractive club at the participants’ university—would moderate 
people’s cheating behavior on difficult tasks. One possibility was that receiving affirmation of 
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any kind would buffer against threat, including the potential failure that accompanies a new, 
difficult task (Creswell et al., 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Sherman et al., 2000; Steele, 1988). 
Yet, past research also suggests that the type of praise one received might matter—that being 
praised for one’s effort and use of good strategies could function as a more effective buffer 
against threat and lead to less cheating than being praised for one’s smarts and talent 
(Henderlong & Lepper, 2002; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). However, in 
the current work, I hypothesized that the context in which the praise was received would 
moderate how it was construed, and thus how it impacted cheating. Because entity organizations 
believe that abilities are fixed, and that even a single failure can signal a lack of that ability, I 
expected that people would be likely to cheat more in entity (vs. incremental) organizations, even 
after praise. Furthermore, I predicted that, when cheating, people would be driven to self-
enhance the quality that the entity organization praised to prove that they possessed the trait. In 
particular, I hypothesized that participants would self-enhance their performance more after 
being praised for their natural abilities and talent; by contrast, I predicted that people would self-
enhance their number attempted more after being praised for their hard work and perseverance.  
Consistent with predictions, the type of praise that participants received from the entity 
organization influenced the type of cheating that they exhibited. Participants inflated their 
performance most after receiving person praise (i.e., “smarts” praise) from the entity 
organization. Moreover, participants cheated about their number attempted to the greatest degree 
when they received process praise from the entity organization. Yet, unexpectedly, these 
participants actually under-reported their attempts on the problem-solving task. One reason for 
this downplaying of their effort is that participants may have been confused or suspicious about 
being praised for their “hard work and perseverance” by an organization that valued (fixed) 
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intelligence. Was their effort praised because the entity organization thought they lacked smarts? 
If so, they may have felt particularly driven to challenge this perception by under-reporting their 
number attempted. Moreover, downplaying their effort may have served a self-handicapping 
purpose. By not having completed the entire task, participants may have been trying to suggest to 
the organization that they could have done better if they had completed additional items. 
In conclusion, I found support for my hypothesis that praise for one’s past 
accomplishments does not always buffer against the threat that accompanies later poor 
performance. Rather, the type of praise that one receives can have different meanings in different 
contexts. In particular, praise might impact cheating behavior on high-stakes tasks more in an 
organization in which you have to prove that you are gifted compared to an organization where 
effort and motivation are the metric of success. Additionally, the most robust finding in the 
praise literature—that people cheat more about their performance after receiving person (vs. 
process) praise—was only observed in the entity context. This particular pattern of results 
introduces the novel possibility that people assume that demanding testing contexts endorse fixed 
beliefs about intelligence—an interesting question that should be explored in future research.     
Theoretical & Practical Implications 
 The present research contributes to the psychological and educational literatures in a host 
of important ways. First, it greatly expands our understanding of how organizations that espouse 
fixed or malleable beliefs of intelligence are perceived, and how these organizational lay theories 
can influence people’s cheating behavior when faced with difficulty. For example, ample 
evidence has shown that entity and incremental theorists endorse performance and mastery goals, 
respectively; yet, this is the first research to date that has demonstrated that attractive entity and 
incremental organizations are actually perceived to value performance and mastery differently. 
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Moreover, by considering organizational (rather than personal) beliefs, I was able to explore 
perceptions that emerge only in group settings—specifically, perceptions of the organization’s 
norms about cheating. Participants perceived differences in the entity and incremental clubs’ 
descriptive and injunctive norms about cheating—a construct that underscores the distinctive 
role that others play in how we experience and behave in the world. In sum, the current work 
underscores the importance of further expanding our understanding of the unique psychological 
and behavioral consequences of being in an entity or incremental context. 
 The current work contributes to the literature on cheating and academic dishonesty by 
introducing an additional situational factor that predicts people’s cheating behavior. For one, few 
studies have examined the antecedents of actual cheating behavior, rather than self-reported or 
hypothetical cheating (e.g., Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Van Yperen et al., 2011). Additionally, 
whereas past research has focused primarily on individual factors that lead to cheating (see 
Jordan, 2001), the current studies provide support for the emerging perspective that even 
situational factors that do not explicitly address cheating—like an organization’s lay theory of 
intelligence—can nonetheless influence people’s cheating behavior in important ways. In fact, 
across all three studies, organizational lay theories of intelligence predicted perceptions of the 
organization’s goals and norms and participants’ cheating behavior, even after statistically 
controlling for important individual predictors of cheating. Why might situational factors 
influence cheating so strongly? One reason may be that belonging to valued groups is a central 
human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Swann & Bosson, 2010). Therefore, how we 
behave—including whether we exhibit defensive and unethical behavior like cheating—may be 
particularly driven by our desire to be accepted into prestigious and attractive groups.  
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 Study 3 also suggests that a more nuanced approach to understanding praise may give us 
a clearer picture of how receiving positive affirmation influences our behavior. Instead of 
concluding simply that process (vs. person) or incremental (vs. entity) lay theories reduce 
cheating, it may instead be the case that the type of praise that people receive and the context in 
which they receive it may interact to influence their cheating behavior. Building upon this work, 
future research is needed to create a more comprehensive picture on how different situational 
factors come together to shape cheating. 
The current work also has noteworthy practical implications. By demonstrating the role 
that organizational lay theories play in people’s cheating behavior, these three studies provide 
organizations—like schools or workplaces—with a potential avenue for reducing cheating. By 
focusing on individual attributes (such as attitudes toward cheating) that predict cheating, past 
research has generally left organizations with little guidance about what they can do to address 
this behavior. However, research (like the current work) that takes a more situational or 
contextual perspective provides concrete steps that settings can take to reduce cheating—for 
example, by endorsing an incremental lay theory of intelligence. 
Notably, when an organization endorses an incremental lay theory of intelligence, it 
confers a host of other benefits, including boosting people’s trust and comfort, diminishing 
defensive self-handicapping, and reducing stereotype threat underperformance (Emerson & 
Murphy, 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; Emerson et al., 2014). Thus, this research contributes to our 
understanding of an additional benefit of endorsing an incremental organizational lay theory—
lower levels of cheating. 
Limitations & Future Directions 
 Despite the noteworthy contributions of the current research, it is not without limitations.  
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First, the studies were generally lacking in statistical power. Past research has never explored 
how organizational lay theories of intelligence influence cheating; thus, the power analysis 
conducted before the onset of data collection instead included all studies that used organizational 
lay theories as a predictor or actual cheating behavior as an outcome. This power analysis 
suggested that 30 to 50 participants would be sufficient to find a difference in cheating between 
the entity and incremental contexts.  
In Study 2, the predicted main effect of organizational lay theory emerged. However, it 
was small (d = .24), and a power analysis on the data from Study 2 suggested that finding the 
desired effect would require nearly 300 participants per group. Thus, I increased the desired 
sample size in Study 3; however, issues with time and participant recruitment prevented me from 
reaching this goal. Promisingly, the significant main effect in Study 3 was similar in size to the 
effect in Study 2 (d = .27). Yet, the lack of power across the three studies prevented me from 
exploring particular ways of operationalizing cheating (i.e., cheating frequency) and may have 
contributed to nonsignificant effects (i.e., the lack of interactions in Study 1).  
To address this power issue, future research should investigate how organizational lay 
theories impact cheating using study design strategies that might maximize the size of the effect. 
Building upon the results of my power analysis, researchers could simply include larger samples 
in their studies. Alternatively, researchers may want to consider ways of measuring cheating that 
maximize cheating rates. For example, instead of giving participants the opportunity to misreport 
their performance or effort, participants could be given the opportunity to copy answers from 
others or from an answer key, look up hints, or use prohibited scratch paper or calculators. A 
third option is to consider how organizational lay theories of intelligence influence other types of 
academic dishonesty (e.g., plagiarism, inappropriate help).  
 	  
	  
68 
 A second limitation concerns our understanding of the direction of change in perceptions 
and behavior across the three studies. For example, did performing for an entity organization 
increase people’s cheating behavior, or did performing for an incremental organization decrease 
it? To address this question, Study 1 included a control group that did not specifically endorse 
any beliefs about intelligence. However, because this study was not sufficiently powered (and 
because no control group was included in Studies 2 and 3), I was unable to determine whether 
the entity or incremental organization (or both) played a bigger role in influencing people’s 
cheating behavior. Thus, future research should include a control group in order to better 
understand how organizations’ beliefs about intelligence shape people’s perceptions of 
organizational norms and values, as well as their cheating behavior.    
An additional limitation of the current work is the lack of statistical mediation found in 
Study 2. This study uncovered important differences in how the norms and goals of entity and 
incremental organizations are perceived. Yet, these differences in organizational perceptions did 
not mediate participants’ cheating behavior, primarily because they did not directly predict 
participants’ cheating behavior.  
If participants’ cheating is not due to perceptions or liking of the organization, what 
might explain why participants cheated more on the demanding task in the entity (vs. 
incremental) context? One possibility is that people in the entity (vs. incremental) context were 
particularly concerned about being negatively evaluated by members of that organization. In 
other words, instead of activating negative evaluations of the self (i.e., feelings about one’s own 
ability), facing potential failure may have led to negative expected evaluations from others (e.g., 
evaluation apprehension, Cottrell, 1972). Future research should continue to investigate the 
psychological motives that underlie participants’ cheating about their performance (and effort) in 
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entity contexts. As described above, one particularly fruitful direction may be to consider the role 
of evaluation concerns or apprehension (e.g., Fear of Negative Evaluation scale; Watson & 
Friend, 1969). 
 Finally, the current studies were limited in their ability to explore participants’ actual and 
misreported effort and persistence. On the number attempted measure, most participants 
completed all of the items; thus, they generally could only under-report their effort. This 
restriction of range is particularly problematic because people who are motivated to cheat might 
do so by inflating or downplaying their number attempted. Whereas downplaying one’s attempts 
can function to preserve the possibility of better performance with more time or effort, inflating 
one’s attempts can demonstrate the hard work and effort that incremental environments value.  
   Furthermore, I did not find that participants exposed to an incremental context showed 
sustained persistence in the face of difficulty by spending more time on the task (S3). There are a 
number of reasons why this additional persistence measure may not have shown the predicted 
differences. It is possible that the error message was very frustrating to participants, that 
participants did not think that they had enough time, or they did not enjoy the task. For these 
reasons, future work may want to consider alternative ways of assessing task persistence. For 
example, participants could be asked to complete a problem-solving task that’s end is dictated 
only by the participant (e.g., unsolvable anagrams task; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975); here, the 
amount of time participants spend on the task—and their self-reported time spent on the task—
could serve as a measure of their actual (and alleged) task persistence. Alternatively, one could 
assess participants’ decision to continue with the difficult task versus opt for an alternate, easier 
task (Hong et al., 1999). In Study 3, participants may have not have had any interest in spending 
additional time on the study; therefore, asking them to select between tasks (rather than select 
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between continuing with or ending the study) may be a better way of measuring their task 
persistence. Also, given that the primary purpose of this measure was to identify a behavior that 
is exhibited more in incremental (vs. entity) contexts, future research could consider different 
outcomes that may be demonstrated more by people in incremental environments. For example, 
similar to Murphy and Dweck (2010), participants in incremental environments may be 
particularly likely to pursue opportunities to demonstrate their enthusiasm and passion—rather 
than simply their IQ—to the organization. In fact, people may even be more likely to inflate 
these qualities (e.g., by lying about hours spend volunteering) in incremental (vs. entity) contexts.  
Concluding Remarks 
 Evidence is emerging to suggest that organizational lay theories of intelligence play an 
important role in how people perceive and experience group settings (Emerson & Murphy, 
2015a; 2015b; 2015c; Emerson et al., 2014; Murphy & Dweck, 2010). The current work 
revealed that people who expect to be evaluated by an organization that endorses more fixed (vs. 
malleable) beliefs perceived that cheating was more common in the organization, and that the 
organization endorsed performance-avoidance goals more and mastery goals less. Moreover, 
people tended to cheat about their performance on a demanding task more in the entity (vs. 
incremental) context, even after being praised for their past performance. Entity contexts are 
common in educational settings (e.g., Mensa, gifted and talented programs, competitive entrance 
exams); thus, many academic settings may be unwittingly communicating values that propagate 
cheating behavior on high-stakes tasks. Fortunately, situational factors, like an organization’s lay 
theory of intelligence, may be more malleable than people’s own personal theories and attitudes. 
Therefore, organizations may want to pay particular attention to how their beliefs and values 
may contribute to cheating among their members. 
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Table 1 
 
 Study 1: Actual Number Correct (with Covariates): Means and Standard Deviations (SDs).32  
 
Performance Standard Condition 
 
M (SD) 
Low Performance Standard 5.54a (2.36) 
High Performance Standard 4.15b (2.33) 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Tables containing single subscripts denote significant effects in rows only (p < .05). In tables 
that include multiple subscripts, each subscript indicates difference in rows and columns, 
respectively. 
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Table 2 
 
 Study 1: Actual Number Attempted (with Covariates): Means and SDs. 
 
Organizational Lay Theory Condition 
 
M (SD) 
Control Condition 17.76a (1.00) 
Entity Condition 17.63a (1.32) 
Incremental Condition 17.08b (1.99) 
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Table 3 
 
 Study 1: Performance—Degree of Cheating (with Covariates): Means and SDs.  
 
Performance Standard Condition 
 
M (SD) 
Low Performance Standard -0.10a (1.04) 
High Performance Standard 0.75b (2.35) 
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Table 4 
 
Study 1: Number of Items Attempted—Degree of Cheating (with Covariates): Means and SDs.  
 
Performance Standard Condition 
 
M (SD) 
Low Performance Standard -0.02a (0.52) 
High Performance Standard -0.55a (2.86) 
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Table 5 
 
Study 2: Bivariate Correlations (r) Between All Mediators. 
 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(1) Descriptive Norms 
 
 
     
 
(2) Injunctive Norms 
 
.41** 
     
 
(3) Perf.-Avoidant Goals 
 
.43** 
 
.38** 
    
 
(4) Perf.-Approach Goals 
 
.09 
 
.10 
 
.45** 
   
 
(5) Mastery Goals 
 
-.52** 
 
-.41** 
 
-.33** 
 
.06 
  
 
(6) Perf.-Contingent Self-Worth 
 
-.05 
 
-.12t 
 
-.01 
 
.16* 
 
.14t 
 
 
(7) State Self-Esteem 
 
 
-.08 
 
-.14t 
 
-.09 
 
-.06 
 
.03 
 
-.10 
Note: Significant correlations are indicated with ** (p < .01), * (p < .05), or t (p < .10). 
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Table 6 
 
Study 2: Perceived Descriptive and Injunctive Norm about Cheating (with Covariates): Means 
and SDs. 
 
 
Norm Type 
Entity Condition 
M (SD) 
 
Incremental 
Condition 
M (SD) 
Descriptive Norm 0.67a (0.52) 0.47b (0.48) 
Injunctive Norm 0.24a (0.37) 0.14a (0.27) 
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Table 7 
 
Study 2: Perceived Performance and Mastery Goals (with Covariates): Means and SDs. 
 
Goal Type Entity Condition 
M (SD) 
 
Incremental 
Condition 
M (SD) 
Performance – Avoid 1.50a (1.05) 1.13b (0.91) 
Performance – Approach 2.54a (0.78) 2.41a (0.83) 
Mastery  3.19a (0.59) 3.42b (0.43) 
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Table 8 
 
Study 2: Performance—Degree of Cheating: 95% Confidence Intervals of Indirect Effects. 
 
 
Mediating Variable 
 
Lower Limit 
 
Upper Limit 
Descriptive Norms -.0124 .2078 
Injunctive Norms -.2111 .0104 
Performance Goals – Avoid -.0002 .2812 
Performance Goals – Approach -.2162 .0188 
Mastery Goals -.0561 .2020 
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Table 9 
 
Study 2: Liking of the Club (with Covariates): Means and SDs.  
 
Organizational Lay Theory Condition 
 
M (SD) 
Entity Condition 1.98a (0.84) 
Incremental Condition 2.30b (0.64) 
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Table 10 
 
Study 3: Actual Number Correct (with Covariates): Means and SDs. 
 
Organization Lay Theory Condition 
 
M (SD) 
 
Entity Condition 
 
4.13a (2.13) 
 
Incremental Condition 
 
 
4.76b (2.42) 
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Table 11 
 
Study 3: Actual Number Attempted (with Covariates): Means and SDs. 
 
  
Person Praise  
 
 
Process Praise 
 
Entity Condition 
 
17.53a, a (1.46)  
 
16.98a, a (2.31) 
 
Incremental Condition 
 
 
16.93a, b (2.21) 
 
17.40a, a (1.54) 
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Table 12 
 
Study 3: Performance—Degree of Cheating (with Covariates): Means and SDs.  
 
  
Person Praise  
 
 
Process Praise 
 
Entity Condition 
 
1.09a, a (2.16) 
 
0.42a, a (1.40) 
 
Incremental Condition 
 
 
-0.04a, b (2.12) 
 
0.47a, a (1.64) 
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Table 13 
 
Study 3: Number of Items Attempted—Degree of Cheating (with Covariates): Means and SDs. 
 
  
Person Praise  
 
 
Process Praise 
 
Entity Condition 
 
-0.13a, a (1.18) 
 
-0.85a, a (3.05)  
 
Incremental Condition 
 
 
-0.44a, a (1.49) 
 
-0.25a, a (1.34) 
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Figure 1. Actual number attempted (out of 18) by condition, Study 3. 
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Figure 2. Degree of cheating about one’s performance, by organizational lay theory and praise 
type conditions, Study 3. More positive scores indicate greater over-reporting of number of items 
answered correctly; more negative scores indicate greater under-reporting of number of items 
answered correctly. 
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Figure 3. Degree of cheating about one’s number attempted, by organizational lay theory and 
praise type conditions, Study 3. More positive scores indicate greater over-reporting of number 
of items attempted; more negative scores indicate greater under-reporting of number of items 
attempted. 
  
-1 
-0.5 
0 
0.5 
 
 
Entity 
 
 
Incremental 
N
um
be
r A
tte
m
pt
ed
 (D
eg
re
e 
o 
C
he
at
in
g)
 
Organizational Lay Theory 
Person Praise 
Process Praise 
 	  
	  
99 
Appendix: Manipulations & Measures 
 
Organizational Lay Theory Manipulation (Excerpts from Sample Meeting Minutes) 
(Entity language bolded, incremental language underlined and in parentheses; control 
manipulation included separately below, language bolded) 
 
XYZ club 
Minutes- August 10, 2014 
 
I. Kevin discussed the first item on the agenda- a vote to invite special speaker, Tim, to 
speak at our next meeting.  Tim is the head of Project Smart (Project Learn)- a group we 
are considering teaming up with for our next volunteer project.   
 
Kevin then reviewed how Project Smart (Project Learn) came to the attention of the 
XYZ club: The club discussed a Project Smart (Project Learn) article distributed at last 
meeting. The article was about how best to tutor kids, given that intelligence is largely 
hereditary and cannot be changed very much (given that that the brain forms new 
connections over time and that intelligence increases over one’s lifespan). Several 
members of the group (Sara, Max and Chris) were drawn to this mission advocated by 
Project Smart’s (Project Learn’s) article.  
 
They introduced an item to the agenda last week to discuss Project Smart’s (Project 
Learn’s) mission and philosophy and how we might use it in our own ongoing projects, 
like tutoring. Because our goal is to help kids in the most informed and educated way 
possible, we want to be sure we are employing the best tutoring methods available. 
  
a) Kevin yielded the floor to Sara who briefly reviewed Project Smart’s (Project Learn’s) 
philosophy for the group. The main philosophy advocated by Project Smart is that 
one-size-fits-all education is not effective. Education should be targeted to 
individuals and help to serve their unique needs, given their level of innate ability.  
(The main philosophy advocated by Project Learn is that a person’s intelligence can be 
increased substantially by environmental factors and effort.) Project Smart (Project 
Learn) focuses on adapting this view point and putting it into practice.    
 
b) Sara said that Project Smart focuses on matching materials to abilities. They try 
to help young geniuses get the kind of challenging materials that match their 
talents. For kids who generally have more trouble, they find materials that are 
congruent with their skills. (Sara said that Project Learn focuses on motivating 
children to find environments and learning strategies that will help them fulfill their 
true potential through effort, learning and discovery- building their intellectual 
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abilities.) Sara discussed ways that the XYZ club could take this viewpoint into 
consideration when we plan activities for the students we currently tutor. 
 
II. Kevin then opened the floor for Open Mic time to hear what members thought about this 
philosophy and about inviting the head of Project Smart (Project Learn) to give a talk about 
that group’s viewpoint and to discuss the possible collaboration between Project Smart 
(Project Learn) and the XYZ club. 
 
a) Anna came up to the mic and described how much she liked this viewpoint and how it 
matched her own experiences. 
 
b) Justin said that from his experience as a mentor to incoming freshmen, he believed the 
viewpoint was true and that the goal of our tutoring should be to identify people’s 
skills and provide tutoring tasks that match these skills (the goal of our tutoring 
should be to find material that will help people increase their abilities.) He would like 
to hear more from the head of Project Smart (Project Learn) about how to do this. 
 
c) Brenda agreed, saying that when she tutored students in Chemistry last year, she was 
surprised by how much her student’s either got the material initially or didn’t (she 
was surprised by how much her student’s always seemed to improve and expand their 
abilities over time.) This seemed to really predict well their grades in the class. 
 
d) Alex said that viewing intelligence as something that is pretty stable (flexible) over 
one’s lifetime was important and that he was excited about implementing this 
philosophy in our tutoring program. Making this viewpoint explicit in our program 
might really help the people we tutor. 
 
e) Joseph said that he thought this applied to both children and adults. That from his 
experience, it seems like qualities such as a person’s intelligence is something that is 
generally immutable (can definitely be expanded upon) so it’s important to keep this 
in mind when tutoring.   
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XYZ club 
Minutes- August 10, 2014 
 
I. Kevin discussed the first item on the agenda- a vote to invite special speaker, Tim, to 
speak at our next meeting.  Tim is the head of Project Tech- a group we are considering 
teaming up with for our next volunteer project.   
 
Kevin then reviewed how Project Tech came to the attention of the XYZ club: The club 
discussed a Project Tech article distributed at last meeting.  The article was about how 
best to tutor kids, given that new technology, from electronic polling to interactive 
whiteboards, is becoming increasingly common in classrooms. Several members of 
the group (Sara, Max and Chris) were drawn to this mission advocated by Project Tech’s 
article.  
 
They introduced an item to the agenda last week to discuss Project Tech’s mission and 
philosophy and how we might use it in our own ongoing projects, like tutoring. Because 
our goal is to help kids in the most informed and educated way possible, we want to be 
sure we are employing the best tutoring methods available. 
  
a) Kevin yielded the floor to Sara who briefly reviewed Project Tech’s philosophy for 
the group.  The main philosophy advocated by Project Tech is that a person can 
best be tutored if he/she is provided with opportunities to use different types of 
technology.  Project Tech focuses on adapting this view point and putting it into 
practice.    
 
b) Sara said that Project Tech focuses on integrating various forms of new 
technology into classrooms and tutoring sites, via an array of hardware and 
operating systems, to educate students in an increasingly high-tech world. Sara 
discussed ways that the XYZ club could take this viewpoint into consideration 
when we plan activities for the students we currently tutor. 
 
 
II. Kevin then opened the floor for Open Mic time to hear what members thought about this 
philosophy and about inviting the head of Project Tech to give a talk about that group’s 
viewpoint and to discuss the possible collaboration between Project Tech and the XYZ 
club. 
 
a) Anna came up to the mic and described how much she liked this viewpoint and how it 
matched her own experiences. 
 
b) Justin said that from his experience as a mentor to incoming freshmen, he believed 
the viewpoint was true and that the goal of our tutoring should be to expose people 
to various forms of new technology.  He would like to hear more from the head of 
Project Tech about how to do this. 
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c) Brenda agreed, saying that when she tutored students in Chemistry last year, she was 
surprised by how much her students differed in their experience with new 
technology.  
 
d) Alex said that viewing new technology as something that is beneficial in the 
classroom was important and that he was excited about implementing this 
philosophy in our tutoring program.  Making this viewpoint explicit in our program 
might really help the people we tutor. 
 
e) Joseph said that he thought this applied to both children and adults.  That from his 
experience, it seems like new technology could help people as they learn so it’s 
important to keep this in mind when tutoring.   
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Member Average Manipulation (S1) 
(High member average language bolded, low member average language underlined and in 
parentheses) 
The problem-solving task that you are about to complete is considered very difficult. On 
average, current members of the XYZ club have correctly answered 10-12 out of the 18 items 
(3-5 out of the 18 items) within the 20 minutes allotted.   
 
 
Praise Manipulation (S3) 
(Entity language bolded, incremental language underlined and in parentheses) 
Dear Participant, 
 
Congratulations! 
 
You have been selected for admission into the XYZ club, an extracurricular club at IU 
founded on principles of leadership, volunteerism and serving the community.   
 
The XYZ club is an award-winning club and was named IU’s most outstanding student 
outreach organization last year. It has been on campus for over 15 years and has a 
reputation for being one of the most active tutoring and volunteer clubs at IU. 
 
You have been selected to join this club because of your responses to particular questions 
in the pre-screening survey. Of all of the participants who completed the pre-screening, it 
was clear to members of the club that you demonstrated the talent and natural ability  
(hard work and perseverance) necessary to be an exceptionally strong addition to the 
XYZ club. We hope that you decide to join us! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Kevin  
XYZ President 
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Dependent Measures 
Sample Item from Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (S1 – S3; Ravens, 1982) 
 
 
Persistence Measure (S3) 
Many participants take less than 60 minutes to complete the entire study. Time permitting, they 
may be allowed to continue working on the problem-solving task.  This can include working on 
new questions or reviewing questions that they have already answered.   
 
PLEASE NOTE: Because the problem-solving task can be restarted, your ability to continue 
with this task is not affected by whether or not you received an error message during the 
task.  
 
Time permitting, how many extra minutes would you like to spend on the problem-solving task 
(maximum 10 minutes)?  
 
_________________ minutes 
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Mediators (S2 only) 
 
Descriptive and Injunctive Cheating Norms of the XYZ club (items of interest only) 
Directions: Using the scale provided, please indicate the extent to which you think members of 
the XYZ club typically do the following behaviors. [descriptive norm] 
Not at all true 
0 
 
1 
Somewhat true 
2 
 
3 
Very true 
4 
 
I expect that members of the XYZ club typically: 
1) Cheat 
2) Lie 
3) Behave ethically [reverse-coded] 
4) Are honest [reverse-coded] 
 
Directions: Using the scale provided, please indicate the extent to which you think the following 
behaviors are accepted or preferred at the XYZ club. [injunctive norm] 
Not at all true 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Extremely true  
5 
 
Generally, I think that the XYZ club accepts or prefers that its members… 
1) Cheat 
2) Lie 
3) Behave ethically [reverse-coded] 
4) Are honest [reverse-coded] 
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Patterns of Adaptive Learning scale, Perception of Classroom Goal Structures subscale 
(Midgley et al., 2000) 
Directions: Using the scale provided, please respond to each of the following statements based 
upon your impressions of the XYZ club.  
Not at all true 
0 
 
1 
Somewhat true 
2 
 
3 
Very true 
4 
 
Mastery Goals 
1) In the XYZ club, trying hard is very important. 
2) In the XYZ club, how much you improve is really important. 
3) In the XYZ club, really understanding the material is the main goal.33 
4) In the XYZ club, it’s important to understand the work, not just memorize it. 
5) In the XYZ club, learning new ideas and concepts is very important. 
6) In the XYZ club, it’s OK to make mistakes as long as you are learning. 
Performance Goals 
1) In the XYZ club, getting good grades is the main goal. [approach] 
2) In the XYZ club, getting right answers is very important. [approach] 
3) In the XYZ club, it’s important to get high scores on tests. [approach] 
4) In the XYZ club, showing others that you are not bad at tasks is really important. [avoid] 
5) In the XYZ club, it’s important that you don’t make mistakes in front of everyone. [avoid] 
6) In the XYZ club, it’s important not to do worse than other students. [avoid] 
7) In the XYZ club, it’s very important not to look dumb. [avoid] 
8) In the XYZ club, one of the main goals is to avoid looking like you can’t do the work. [avoid] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 This item was excluded from analysis because it did not load reliably with the other items. 
 	  
	  
107 
Contingencies of Self-Worth scale, Academic Competence subscale (Crocker et al., 2003) 
Directions: Using the scale provided, please respond to each of the following statements 
concerning how you feel right now.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
 
Neutral 
Agree 
Somewhat 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
  
1) Right now, my opinion about myself isn’t tied to how well I do in school. [reverse-coded] 
2) Right now, doing well in school gives me a sense of self-respect. 
3) Right now, I feel better about myself if I know I’m doing well academically. 
4) Right now, my self-esteem is influenced by my academic performance. 
5) Right now, I feel bad about myself if my academic performance is lacking. 
 
State Self-Esteem scale, Performance Component (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) 
Direction: Using the scale provided, please respond to each of the following statements 
concerning what you feel is true of yourself at this moment.  
Not at all A little bit Somewhat Very much Extremely 
 
1) At this moment, I feel confident about my abilities. 
2) At this moment, I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance. [reverse-coded] 
3) At this moment, I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read. [reverse-
coded] 
4) At this moment, I feel as smart as others. 
5) At this moment, I feel confident that I understand things. 
6) At this moment, I feel that I have less scholastic ability than others. [reverse-coded] 
7) I feel like I’m not doing well. [reverse-coded] 
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Other Measures 
 
Personal Lay Theories of Intelligence scale (S1 – S3; Dweck, 1999) 
Directions: Using the scale provided, please respond to each of the following statements based 
upon your personal beliefs. 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1) You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do much to change it. 
[reverse-coded] 
2) No matter who you are, you can significantly change their intelligence level. 
3) Intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much. [reverse-coded] 
4) You can always substantially change how intelligent you are. 
 
Beliefs about the Acceptability of Cheating (S1 – S3; Anderman et al., 1998) 
Directions: Using the scale provided, please respond to each of the following statements based 
upon your personal beliefs. Please note that your responses to these items, along with all other 
items, are completely anonymous and confidential. 
Not at all true of me 
(0) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
Very true of me 
(4) 
 
1) It is very serious if somebody cheats on schoolwork. [reverse-coded] 
2) If I were sure I wouldn’t get caught, I would cheat on my schoolwork. 
3) It is okay to cheat on schoolwork.  
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Organizational Lay Theory Manipulation Check (S1 – S3; Emerson & Murphy, 2015a) 
Directions: Using the scale provided, please respond to each of the following statements based 
upon your impressions of the XYZ club. 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1) The XYZ club seems to believe that people have a certain amount of intelligence, and they 
can’t really do much to change it. [reverse-coded] 
2) The XYZ club seems to believe that no matter who they are, people can significantly change 
their intelligence level. 
3) The XYZ club seems to believe that intelligence is something about people that they can’t 
change very much. [reverse-coded] 
4) The XYZ club seems to believe that people can always substantially change how intelligent 
they are. 
 
Member Average Manipulation Check (S1) 
MEMORY CHECK: What was the average performance on the problem-solving task by current 
members of the XYZ club? (Circle one.) 
0-2 items correct 3-5 items correct 6-9 items correct 
10-12 items correct 13-15 items correct 16-18 items correct 
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Praise Manipulation Check (S3) 
MEMORY CHECK: Please indicate why YOU were selected for admission into the XYZ club. 
This information was provided to you in your packet at the beginning of the experiment. (Circle 
one). 
 
Your talent and  
natural ability 
 
 
Your hard work and 
perseverance 
 
You were not selected for 
admission to the club 
 
 
 
Suspicion Probes (S1 – S3) 
1) Did anything about this study look familiar? [S1-S3] 
2) Did anything about this study seem suspicious? [S1-S3] 
3) Please describe the computer’s functionality when you completed the problem-solving task. 
[S1-S3] 
4) What was your reaction to being accepted into the XYZ club? [S3] 
5) Do you have anything feedback that you’d like to share with the researchers? [S1-S3] 
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